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401(k)-type pension arrangements are the most popular tax subsidy to household saving
in the U.S. This study uses self- and firm-reported pension information, Social Security,
and household wealth data from 1992 Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to examine the
extent to which 401(k) pension plans have raised household saving. Comparison of self-
and firm-reported pension information indicates significant measurement error in self-
reported 401(k) eligibility.  This error has biased the estimated 401(k) saving effects in
all previous studies upward significantly and differentially by income category.   There is
evidence of significant measurement error in pension assets as well.  Overall, the
estimates that account for both types of measurement error suggest that 401(k)s have not
raised household saving.  All of the estimates are significantly lower than those implied
by previous studies that have found large effects.  The most plausible explanation for the
large estimated offset to household saving is firm-level substitution of 401(k)s for other
pensions.  Even though very little of the average dollar of 401(k) wealth appears to be
new household saving, 401(k)s may have stimulated saving significantly for lower-to-
middle income households and, hence, increased retirement income security for an
important segment of the population.2
1.  Introduction
The most popular tax subsidy to household saving in the United States is the 401(k)-type
pension arrangement. 401(k)s subsidize saving through income-tax deferral on wages and salary
dedicated to retirement saving and through investment accrual at the pre-tax interest rate.
Although enabled by legislation in 1978, they effectively were not adopted until the Internal
Revenue Service issued clarifying rules in 1981.  Since then, they have grown remarkably and
become the primary vehicle for retirement saving.   In 1996, 33% of all private pension assets,
33% of all pension plans, and 45% of all active pension participants were in 401(k)s.  The $104
billion in 401(k) contributions represented 61% of all pension contributions and 38% of National
Income and Product Account (NIPA) personal saving that year.  Benefits paid from 401(k)s
represented 38% of total pension benefits disbursed.
1
Despite their prominent role, the empirical evidence about their effects on household saving
has been debated heavily.  In a series of influential papers, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994a,
1994b, 1995, 1996, 1998a) and Venti and Wise (1996) have argued that 401(k) saving is
predominantly new and not offset by declines in other saving.  In contrast, Engen, Gale, and
Scholz (1994, 1996) and Engen and Gale (1996, 2000) argued that 401(k) saving has been offset
significantly by reductions in other saving.  Even more striking is that these opposing findings
were estimated using the same data: the 1984, 1987, and 1991 Surveys of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP).
The fundamental difficulty in this literature is that unobserved heterogeneity in household
saving may bias estimated saving effects.  For example, some households may be “savers,”
others not.  Savers save more in all forms, including 401(k)s, so that a positive correlation
between 401(k) participation and high saving is not evidence necessarily of a causal effect.
                                                
1 These figures are the author’s calculations from U.S. Department of Labor (2000).   See Turner and Beller (1992) and
Employee Benefit Research Institute (1995) for excellent discussions of trends in retirement benefits. Poterba (1994a), Papke3
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1998a) and Venti and Wise (1996) have
developed numerous strategies to circumvent this problem.
2  The most convincing is quasi-
experimental and termed “the eligibility experiment” [Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995)].
Because 401(k)s are employment-based, only employees at firms with a plan are eligible to
participate.  They argued that the firm’s adoption is largely exogenous with respect to any given
worker’s unobserved taste for saving.
3  Therefore, they estimated the 401(k) saving effect by a
comparison of the financial assets (401(k) assets included) of eligible (the treatment group) and
ineligible (the control group) households in the SIPP.  All of the difference in financial assets
between the groups was due to the difference in 401(k) assets.  Although their characterization of
these findings was that the bulk of 401(k) wealth was new saving, their estimates clearly implied
that 401(k)s raised household saving dollar-for-dollar.
4
One shortcoming of their analysis is the emphasis on financial assets rather than all assets
that finance retirement consumption.  Such assets include financial as well as pension and Social
Security assets.
5  Unfortunately, the SIPP did not measure the latter sources of wealth. The
current paper adopts the Poterba, Venti, and Wise eligibility experiment framework, but uses
household wealth data from the 1992 Health and Retirement Study (HRS).  The HRS surveyed
individuals born between 1931-41 and their spouses (regardless of birth year).  It has detailed
data on pension assets (on the current and previous jobs) reported both by the respondent and the
firm.  In addition, it has matched Social Security assets from the Social Security Administration
(SSA).  It is the only household data source with this information.
                                                                                                                                                            
(1999), Papke, Petersen, and Poterba (1996), Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996), Hubbard and Skinner (1996), and Poterba, Venti,
and Wise (1996, 1998a, 1998b) analyzed aspects of the growth in 401(k)s relative to other retirement saving vehicles.
2 These methods are described in detail in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996, 1998a).
3 Specifically, they argued that eligibility was exogenous conditional on income.  This is discussed in more detail in the text
below.
4 In fact, Bernheim (1999) interpreted this evidence as consistent with 401(k)s having crowded in saving at ratios greater than
1:1.
5 In principle, housing equity can finance retirement consumption, although, in practice, the elderly spend down very little
housing equity [Venti and Wise (1984, 1989, 1990a, 1991)].4
The key question is whether 401(k)-eligible households have greater total assets to finance
retirement.  I am able to replicate the Poterba, Venti, and Wise findings for financial assets:
eligible households have significantly higher financial assets than ineligible households, and all
of the difference is due to 401(k) assets.  However, when the saving measure is broadened to
include all pension assets, there is no difference between eligible and ineligible households using
the self-reported pension data in the HRS.  There is a significant negative correlation between
401(k) and non-401(k) pension assets.  In particular, ineligible households self-reported more
assets in defined benefit pensions than eligible households.
However, a comparison of the self- and firm-reported pension data indicates significant
measurement error in eligibility in the self-reported data that varies with household income.
Lower-to-middle income households understate eligibility.  High-income households overstate
eligibility.   Furthermore, the measurement error is highly correlated with saving behavior.
Analyses with self-reported eligibility (all of the previous literature) yield estimated saving
effects that are biased upward significantly.
In addition, there is significant measurement error in self-reported pension assets.  When
firm-reported pension assets and eligibility are used instead of the self-reported data to address
this measurement error, a different picture emerges.  401(k)s generate economically large and
sometimes statistically significant household saving effects for lower-to-middle income
households: the average dollar contributed generates between 70 cents and one dollar of new
household saving.  However, these saving effects attenuate with income.  They are much smaller
economically (and even negative) and not statistically different from zero for middle-to-upper
income households.  Over all households, 38 cents of the average dollar of 401(k) wealth
represent new household saving, with an estimated standard error of 16 cents.  However, defined
contribution and 401(k) assets derived from the firm-reported data likely significantly overstate
actual values.  When the firm- and self-reported plan value data are integrated to better reflect5
actual values, a qualitatively similar pattern of large saving effects that decline with income is
found, but the overall impact on household saving is estimated to be minus 8 cents, with a
standard error of 29 cents, and not statistically different than zero.
Overall, there is little evidence that 401(k)s have raised household saving.  All estimates are
significantly lower than those implied by the Poterba, Venti, and Wise studies but similar to
those in Engen and Gale (2000).  They also constrast with the findings of Engelhardt (1996) and
Venti and Wise (1986, 1990) for other tax subsidies to saving.  One plausible explanation for the
large estimated offset to household saving is firm-level substitution of 401(k)s for other
pensions.  In addition, even though very little of the average dollar of 401(k) wealth appears to
be new household saving, the best specifications indicate 401(k)s may have stimulated saving
significantly for lower-to-middle income households and, hence, increased retirement income
security for an important segment of the population.
The paper is organized as follows.  Sections 2 and 3 describe 401(k)-type pension
arrangements and the existing evidence on 401(k) saving effects, respectively.  The empirical
analysis from the HRS is described in section 4.   Section 5 discusses corroborating firm-level
evidence on pension plan substitution. There is a brief conclusion.
2.  401(k)-Type Pension Arrangements
Unlike Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA’s), 401(k)-type pension arrangements are
employment-based.  Only employees of firms that offer these plans are eligible. They are defined
contribution plans and are a subset of Cash or Deferred Arrangements (CODA’s). Legally, the
term “401(k)” refers to defined contribution plans qualified under section 401(k) of the Internal
Revenue Code (IRC).  However, researchers, policy makers, and the media frequently use this
term loosely to describe plans that offer elective employee pre-tax contributions based on salary
reduction.  The array of plans with this feature is remarkably broad.  For example, savings or
thrift plans that allow pre-tax contributions from salary reduction must follow rules for 401(k)s.6
The same applies to profit-sharing plans.  Qualified nonprofit organizations and public school
systems can sponsor elective tax-deferred savings plans under section 403(b) of the IRC.
Essentially, 403(b)’s operate like 401(k)s.  Plans for state and local government employees
qualified under section 457 of the IRC also have 401(k)-type features.
Their distinguishing feature is they allow employees to make elective contributions on a pre-
tax basis, funded by a reduction in the employee’s salary.   Hence, they are referred to frequently
as Salary Reduction Arrangements (SRA’s).  The employer may contribute as well, often
matching a pre-determined fraction of the employee’s elective contribution.  The typical match is
50% of employee contributions up to 6% of wages and salary.   The account funds accrue at the
pre-tax interest rate and are taxed as ordinary income at withdrawal.
3.  Existing Evidence on 401(k) Saving Effects
In a series of influential papers using the 1984, 1987, and 1991 SIPP, Poterba, Venti, and
Wise (1994a, 1994b, 1995, 1996, 1998a) and Venti and Wise (1996) developed various
empirical methods to estimate the 401(k) saving effect.  Each attempted to minimize the bias
from unobserved heterogeneity.  While these methods and the sheer size of their published work
are too large to discuss here, their findings consistently point to a very large 401(k) saving effect:
on the order of a dollar-for-dollar stimulus to household saving.  The interested reader is referred
to Bernheim (1997, 1999), Hubbard and Skinner (1996), Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996, 1998a),
and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996) for extensive reviews of these methods.
The most convincing method is the “eligibility experiment” in Poterba, Venti, and Wise
(1995).  Employers determine 401(k) eligibility. They argued that firms have adopted them such
that eligibility essentially was random with respect to any given worker.  Specifically, they
showed empirically that eligibility differed across income categories but, within income
category, was not correlated with characteristics such as age.  They used this to estimate the
saving effect of 401(k)s.7
Their empirical strategy was in two parts.  First, they compared the total financial assets
(401(k)s included) of eligible to ineligible households. A necessary condition for a positive
saving effect was that eligible households should have had higher total financial assets than
ineligible households, ceteris paribus.  Second, they compared the non-401(k) assets of eligible
to ineligible households.  A necessary condition for a positive saving effect was that the non-
401(k) assets of eligible households should have been no different than those of ineligible
households, ceteris paribus.  That is, all of the difference in financial assets between the two
groups should have been due to 401(k) assets.
Econometrically, this comparison can be written as
, i
Eligible
i a a ai D A e g b + + = (1)
where i indexes the household, i=1,...,n, a denotes the asset measure, A is the dollar amount of
assets, 
Eligible
i D  is a dummy variable that is one if the household is eligible for a 401(k) and zero
otherwise, and e  is a random error term.  g  measures the effect of eligibility on asset balances.
If eligibility is exogenous, then  0 ) , ( = e
Eligible D Cov , and the 401(k) saving effect, g , can be
estimated consistently.  But because Poterba, Venti, and Wise argued that eligibility was
exogenous conditional on income, they estimated these between-group differences controlling














where X was the vector of demographic characteristics and  ij Y  was an indicator variable that was
one if household i had income in interval j and zero otherwise. The asset measures analyzed were
total financial assets, non-IRA-401(k) assets, 401(k) assets, and IRA assets.  The income
intervals (in thousands) were less than 10, 10-20, 20-30, 30-40, 40-50, 50-75, and over 75.   aj g  is8
the 401(k) saving effect for each asset type and income category, respectively.  Now, given
income and demographics, the identifying assumption is
0 ) , | , ( = Y X D Cov
Eligible e .( 3 )
Because the distribution of assets is right-skewed, Poterba, Venti, and Wise estimated the
parameters in (2) with median regression (separately for the 1984, 1987, and 1991 SIPP).  The
median regression estimator produces consistent estimates of the 401(k) saving effects (by
income category),  aj g .  In addition, these estimates are efficient relative to mean regression.
Their results for 1991 are reproduced in Table 1.  It shows the conditional median asset balances
for eligible and ineligible households by asset measure and income category.  These balances
were calculated with the parameter estimates from (2) evaluated at the sample mean of the
demographic variables.  Eligible households had significantly higher total financial asset
balances than ineligible households.  These differences were economically large for all income
categories and statistically significant at the 5% level for 6 of the 7 categories. Importantly, there
was little difference between eligible and ineligible households for non-IRA-401(k) financial
assets.  In only 3 of 7 categories were the groups statistically different and those differences were
not large economically.  This was evidence of no offset within financial-asset saving.
6  Because
the non-IRA-401(k) financial assets were the same but the total financial assets differed due to
401(k) assets,  they interpreted this as evidence in favor of a substantial 401(k) saving effect.
Under this empirical strategy, it was important that eligible and ineligible households did not
differ at the onset of the program (effectively, 1981).  The earliest household survey with 401(k)
information was the 1984 SIPP. For 1984, just three years after the IRS clarified plan rules, they
found no difference in non-IRA-401(k) assets between eligible and ineligible households. This
was important supporting evidence of a substantial saving effect.
                                                
6 They found similar results for 1987.9
There have been a number of criticisms of this method.
7  First, although there was no
substitution  within financial assets, there may have been substitution between financial and non-
financial assets that could have accounted for the asset differences between eligible and
ineligible households [Engen and Gale (1996, 2000) and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994, 1996)].
For example, as aggregate 401(k) assets rose significantly in the late 1980’s, mortgage debt rose
as well.  Engen and Gale (1996, 2000) found substitution between 401(k) assets and mortgage
debt in this period using the SIPP.  In particular, 401(k)-eligible households had greater financial
assets than ineligible households, but more mortgage debt as well.  Strikingly, the two groups did
not differ in terms of total private wealth.
8   However, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996, 1998a)
performed a related analysis in the SIPP and concluded the opposite: no substitution between
401(k) assets and mortgage debt.
Second, there may have been substitution between financial assets and public and private
pensions. Almost all estimates of 401(k) saving effects have used the SIPP.
9  The SIPP asked
respondents direct questions on 401(k) eligibility, had detailed questions on income and financial
and 401(k) assets, and having started in 1984, roughly covered the expansion of 401(k)s.
However, it had no information on two important components of retirement saving: the present
value of claims to non-401(k) pension plans (i.e., defined benefit and non-401(k) defined
contribution plans) and Social Security.
The private pension omission is problematic.  From the description above, it is clear there
were two types of ineligible households.  First, there were households with no pension coverage
during their lifetime.  Second, there were households that had pension coverage from plans other
than 401(k)s.  The linchpin of the quasi-experimental framework above was that eligibility was
exogenous (conditional on income and demographics).  But this may not have been true because
                                                
7 See Bernheim (1999) and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996), for example.
8 Private wealth was defined as the sum of financial and housing assets less the sum of financial and mortgage debt.10
401(k) eligibility and other pension coverage may have been correlated inversely if there was
firm-level substitution of 401(k)s for other pension plans.  In principle, such substitution in
combination with substitution of other pension assets for financial assets could have accounted
for positive saving effects estimated in previous studies.  For example, ineligible households
might have had greater other pension wealth because many after-tax thrift plans were converted
to 401(k)s in the 1980’s [Andrews (1992), Papke (1995, 1999)].  Those assets would have
appeared in the SIPP as 401(k) assets for eligible households but not measured for ineligible
households.
10   This could have accounted for the asset differences Poterba, Venti, and Wise
found.  Similarly, the Social Security omission could have biased the estimated effects if Social
Security was greater for ineligible than eligible households and there was an offset between
Social Security and financial assets.
However, the most frequent criticism has been that eligibility is not exogenous [Engen, Gale,
and Scholz (1994, 1996), Engen and Gale (1996, 2000), Bernheim (1999), Ippolito (1996)].
Rather, it is positively correlated with workers’ taste for saving. A number of theoretical
explanations have been put forth.  First, workers with a high taste for saving sort themselves to
firms that offer pensions, and, in particular, 401(k)s [Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1993),
Curme and Even (1995), Ippolito (1996), Even and McPherson (1996)].  Second, firms with
401(k)s may have adopted them in response to employee interest.  This may have been true
especially in small firms.  In a survey of firms by Buck Consultants (1989), employee interest
was cited as a reason for 401(k) adoption by 63.5% of firms.   Finally, Ippolito (1996) has argued
that firms may have used 401(k)s, and matching, in particular, to direct additional compensation
to workers with a low rate of time preference as part of an optimal employee retention policy.
11
                                                                                                                                                            
9 Pence (1999) and Sabelhaus and Ayotte (1999), who used the Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF), and Bernheim and Garrett
(1996), who used a Merrill Lynch survey, have been exceptions.
10 This and other mechanisms for explicit and implicit firm-level substitution of 401(k)s for other pensions are discussed in
Section 5 below.
11 Pence (1999) has represented one of the few attempts to control directly for tastes for saving in the eligibility experiment
framework.  She used the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which asked a set of qualitative questions on reasons for11
4.  New Evidence from the HRS
Overall, the arguments for and against the exogeneity of eligibility both have some
plausibility.   Because it is very difficult to conceive of an empirical strategy (short of a
randomized trial) to illustrate convincingly the relationship (or lack thereof) between eligibility
and tastes, the current paper adopts the Poterba, Venti, and Wise eligibility experiment
methodology.  It maintains the assertion that eligibility conditional on income and demographics
is not correlated with tastes for saving.  An important contribution is to estimate the 401(k)
saving effect accounting for other public and private pension wealth.  Specifically, it uses
detailed data on 401(k)s, other pensions, Social Security, and private wealth from wave 1 of the
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and examines whether 401(k)s have stimulated retirement
saving, more broadly defined.
12
The HRS has a number of advantages.  First, it contains detailed data on household financial
and housing wealth. Arguably, they are as good or better than the SIPP data. Second, the study
obtained detailed information from both the respondent and employer on private pensions on
current and past jobs.
13  Third, respondents were asked permission to link their survey responses
to administrative earnings histories and benefits records from the Social Security Administration
(SSA).  With detailed financial, housing, pension, and Social Security wealth, the HRS is the
                                                                                                                                                            
saving (retirement, emergencies, kids’ education, or, don’t save), risk-taking (above average risks, average risks, no risks),
planning horizon (short-term, medium-term, long-term), bequest expectations, and uncertainty about the economy.  Consistently,
eligible households more frequently reported they saved for retirement, had a longer planning horizon, and took greater risks than
ineligible households. In addition, eligible households were less likely to have reported they did not save and were uncertain
about the economy.   Her estimates for (2) using the SCF confirmed the Poterba, Venti, and Wise findings for total financial
assets.  However, when a set of dummy variables for responses to the qualitative questions were added to the specification to
control directly for tastes for saving, the estimated difference in total financial assets between eligible and ineligible households
fell by about 25% and frequently was no longer statistically significant. These results can be interpreted in a number of ways.
Naturally, they suggest eligibility is correlated with a taste for saving.   However, two of the three reasons most highly correlated
with eligibility were “reported saving for retirement” and “had a longer planning horizon.”  It is conceivable that the eligible
households gave these answers because they were eligible for a 401(k).   That is, the “treatment” of 401(k) eligibility itself may
have affected attitudes toward retirement saving and planning.  In the end, it is not possible to separately identify whether these
qualitative responses reflect tastes for saving independent of eligibility.
12 The HRS is a longitudinal study of a sample of individuals age 51-61 in 1992.  These individuals and spouses (regardless of the
spouse’s age) were included in the study.  There were a total of 12,652 individuals in the first wave (1992) that comprised 7,607
households.  Detailed descriptions, discussion, and background information on the structure of the HRS can be found in Moon
and Juster (1995), Smith (1995), Gustman and Steinmeier (1999a, 1999b), and Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick, and Steinmeier
(1999).12
only household survey to give complete coverage of the household portfolio.  Finally, the survey
was well timed.  Because they were 51-61 in 1992, the main respondents were 40-50 in 1981, the
effective starting date for 401(k)s.  Therefore, the HRS sample moved through their prime
retirement saving years during the expansion of the 401(k) program.   Any 401(k) saving effect
should have been apparent in the HRS data.
The primary disadvantage is that the HRS only covers one birth cohort (i.e., those born 1931-
41).  The estimated saving effects may not apply to younger cohorts.  This is discussed in more
detail in the conclusion.
4.2.   Empirical Results with the Self-Reported Data
A sample of households from the 1992 HRS (Wave 1) was drawn.  Each household
contained at least one individual with a current job who reported they were not self-employed.
This selection rule was identical to that in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994, 1995).  The final
sample consisted of 4,318 households. Overall, 35 percent of these households were 401(k)
eligible and, as in other studies, eligibility rose with household income. A detailed description of
the sample and eligibility are given in Appendix A.
Conditional median asset balances by eligibility and income categories for the HRS are
shown in Table 2.  As in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995), these were calculated using the
median regression parameter estimates from (2) evaluated at the sample mean of the
demographic variables.  Importantly, their findings were replicated in the HRS.  Across all
income categories, eligible households had greater total financial assets than ineligible
households (panel A).  These differences were economically large and statistically significant.
The p-value for the test of the null hypothesis that this difference is zero is in square brackets.
All p-values were based on bootstrapped estimated variances with 300 replications.  Also, the
differences in non-IRA-401(k) financial assets were small and not statistically significant (panel
                                                                                                                                                            
13 These data are described in detail in Appendix A.  Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick, and Steinmeier (1999) and Gustman and13
B).   This suggests no substitution within financial assets and that all 401(k) assets represented
new saving.
However, the results change when the asset measure is total financial and private pension
assets (panel E).  Pension assets are the present value of the household’s claims to assets in
defined benefit and defined contribution plans and the present value of any annuitized pensions.
It captures pension assets on current and past jobs and was calculated by Venti and Wise (1997)
from the self-reported pension information in wave 1 of the HRS.  For all income categories,
there are no statistically or economically significant differences between eligible and ineligible
households.  In addition, in four of the six categories, the economic differences are small.
Furthermore, in four categories, ineligible households actually have more assets than eligible
households.  These findings are due to an inverse correlation between 401(k) eligibility and non-
401(k) pension assets (panel F).  Ineligible households have much greater other pension wealth.
Once this other wealth is accounted for, the Poterba, Venti, and Wise results go away.
14
For each income category in Table 2, the panel E wealth differences are consistent estimates
of the true differences between eligible and ineligible households (under the identifying
assumption (3)). To evaluate the economic magnitude of these estimates and their implications
for aggregate household saving, the amount of new household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth
was calculated by dividing these estimates by the mean 401(k) balance for eligible households in
that category.
15  These quotients are shown at the bottom of the table.  Four of the six estimates
are negative.   The largest estimate is 54 cents for households with income greater than $75,000.
Because the household saving effects differed by income category, two weighted-average
saving effects are presented at the bottom of Table 2.  The first calculates the average effect by
multiplying the income-category saving effects by income-category weights based on the
                                                                                                                                                            
Steinmeier (1999c) have provided comprehensive evaluations of this information.
14 Similar results using mean regression are available from the author upon request.
15 This follows the method in Engelhardt (1996).14
fraction of aggregate households in each category.  These fractions, in turn, were calculated from
the HRS household analysis sampling weights.  This “household-weighted” average new
household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth was -0.02.  That is, the “average” household had a
401(k) household saving effect of minus 2 cents.  The standard error associated with this
estimate was 48 cents.  However, from a purely fiscal perspective, what matters is the impact of
401(k)s on aggregate household saving.  Even though 401(k)s appear to have decreased saving
for lower-to-middle income households, these households may have accounted for a
comparatively small fraction of all dollars accumulated in 401(k)s.  Specifically, households with
income between $20,000 and $75,000 accounted for 65.1 percent of all 401(k) households, but
just 47.8 percent of all 401(k) wealth.  Therefore, the second measure calculates the weighted-
average effect by multiplying the income-category saving effects by income-category weights
based on the fraction of aggregate 401(k) wealth (in dollars) in each income category.  These
fractions, in turn, were calculated using both the sampling weights and the household 401(k)
wealth data.  This “dollar-weighted” average new household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth
was 0.15.  That is, 15 cents of the average dollar in a 401(k) represented new household saving.
The standard error associated with this estimate was 31 cents.  The 95 percent confidence
interval for the household saving effect is from minus 47 to 77 cents. This point estimate is
significantly lower than that implied by the Poterba, Venti, and Wise studies but similar to those
in Engen and Gale (2000).
Panels G through K give results for alternative asset categories.  There was little difference in
the present value of claims to Social Security between eligible and ineligible households (panel
G).
16  These balances are statistically different for three categories, but small in percentage
terms: eligible households had 5 to 8 percent more in Social Security assets than ineligible
                                                
16 These data are described in Appendix A.  Because not all respondents gave permission to match Social Security records, the
estimates in panels G and K were over a slightly smaller sample of 3,927 households.  When all specifications in Table 2 were
run over this sample of 3,927 households, the results did not change.15
households.  Therefore, in terms of lifetime earnings, the two groups were similar.  To the extent
unobserved heterogeneity, such as in the rate of time preference, is correlated with lifetime
earnings, this result gives some support to the assertion that eligibility was exogenous.  Eligible
households had greater total financial and housing wealth than ineligible households (panel H).
This must be attributed to 401(k) assets, because the groups did not differ greatly in terms of
housing wealth (panel I).  In particular, eligible households did not have significantly less
housing wealth than ineligible households. However, when other pension wealth is added and
total non-Social Security wealth is considered (panel J), there were no differences between
eligible and ineligible households.  Finally, the asset measure in panel K is total wealth.  It is the
sum of financial, housing, pension, and Social Security wealth.  It is the broadest measure.
Although for many income categories, eligible households have greater total wealth, these
differences are not statistically significant.  There appears little evidence in favor of a 401(k)
saving effect at any income level.
4.3.  Measurement Error in Eligibility
Like all of the previous literature, this analysis relied on self-reported 401(k) eligibility.
However, individuals may have misreported plan type. This could have happened for a number
of reasons: someone with a defined benefit reported a defined contribution plan (or vice versa);
someone with a non-401(k) defined contribution plan reported a 401(k); someone with a defined
benefit and 401(k) plan reported just the defined benefit plan, etc. In any of these (or the many
other possible) cases, 401(k) eligibility, the primary explanatory variable in equation (2), was
measured incorrectly.
The HRS is well suited to address measurement error in eligibility.  It administered a Pension
Provider Survey (PPS) to and attempted to obtain Summary Plan Descriptions (SPD) for all
pensions from employers of all individuals that self-reported a (current or past) pension-covered
job.  The match rates were 65 percent of those currently working (in wave 1) in pension-covered16
jobs, 66 percent for the last job for those not working, and 35 percent for jobs held five years or
longer prior to the current (last) job for those working (not working).
To examine the extent of reporting error in 401(k) eligibility on the current job, Table 3
compares eligibility based on the matched firm-reported pension information with that from the
self-reported information.
17  Results for the primary sample are shown in Panel A.  It contains all
observations from the self-reported sample (of 4,318 households) used above that had matched
firm pension records on all pension-covered jobs.
18  Even though this is a strict criterion for
inclusion, it ensures a sample in which eligibility is measured precisely.
19  Because of the less-
than-perfect match rates described above, this sample contains 1,312 of the 4,318 households in
the self-reported data sample from above.
20
The results in panel A indicate significant measurement error in self-reported 401(k)
eligibility on the current job.   For all households with pension coverage on the current job, 43.4
percent were actually eligible based on the firm-reported data compared to 41.2 percent with the
self-reported data.  However, this masks important variation in error across household income
categories.  Lower-income households were more likely to have classified themselves incorrectly
as ineligible.  This error was large.  Actual eligibility averaged 8.5 percentage points higher than
self-reported eligibility for households with annual income under $40,000.  This represented a 21
percent difference in the two eligibility rates. In contrast, higher-income households were more
likely to have classified themselves incorrectly as eligible. This error was large, too.  Self-
reported eligibility was 9.6 percentage points higher than actual eligibility for households with
annual income above $75,000.
21  This represented a 20 percent difference in the two eligibility
                                                
17 The firm-reported eligibility measure is described in Appendix A.
18 That is, if an individual had two pension-covered jobs, then matched records were needed on both jobs for the individual to
have entered this sample.  For married households, both spouses needed to have met this criterion.
19 The sample will be broadened in the sensitivity analysis below.
20 Of the 4,318 households in the sample for the self-reported data analysis in Table 2, only 3,013 were in pension-covered
current jobs.  So the 1,312 households just described represent 43.5 percent of comparable households in Table 2.
21 Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994, 1995) motivated their specification in equation (2) by the fact that even though eligibility
(self-reported in the SIPP) rose with income, conditional on income, eligibility was unrelated to demographic factors, such as
age.  Table 3 shows that actual eligibility for those that were pension covered on the current job was remarkably even across17
rates.  Similar results were obtained in panel B, where the sample selection criterion was
loosened to include all households with matched records on the current job.
22
The type of error was striking as well.  In panel A of Table 4, 37.3 percent of these
households correctly self-reported not eligible.  In panel B, 21.9 percent correctly reported
eligible.  However, 21.5 percent failed to self-report eligible when actually eligible (panel C). In
83 percent (i.e., 235/282=0.83) of these misclassified cases, the household reported a defined
benefit plan but not the 401(k).
23 The other 17 percent of these cases (i.e., 47/282=0.17) involved
individuals who reported a non-401(k) defined contribution plan, such as a profit-sharing plan,
that actually was qualified legally under section 401(k) of the IRC because it provided for
voluntary employee contributions through salary reduction.   About 19 percent of households
erroneously reported eligible when actually ineligible (panel D).  Almost 64 percent (i.e.,
162/254=0.638) of these misclassified cases involved a household that reported a defined benefit
plan and mistakenly reported a 401(k) plan.
Tables 3 and 4 indicate significant measurement error in self-reported 401(k) eligibility.  This
is a very important finding because all of the previous literature has used self-reported data to
determine eligibility.
24  Therefore, all previous estimates of the saving effect of 401(k)s
potentially were biased and inconsistent, and, at a minimum, should be viewed with caution.
Table 5 provides insight into the sign and relative magnitude of the bias. Households could
have reported pension information that classified them as eligible when actually ineligible.
Columns 1 and 2 show the percent of the subsample of 1,312 households with matched pension
                                                                                                                                                            
household income categories.  It is only when households that had no pension coverage during their lifetime are added to the
samples in panels A and B, respectively, that eligibility rises with income (obviously, these additional households were ineligible
for a 401(k) and have zero pension wealth).  Expanding the sample in panel A with these additional households, the eligibility
rates for the six income categories in ascending order are 15.7, 27.1, 31.0, 36.2, 37.4, and 40.8 percent, respectively.   This
implies that the positive eligibility-household income profile is solely due to differences across household income categories in
the rate of pension coverage, a fact pointed out by Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994).
22 That is, the difference between the samples in panels A and B is that panel A required matched records on all pension-covered
jobs (current or past), whereas panel B required a match on just the pension-covered current job.  This expanded the sample
significantly because, as described above, the match rate was lowest on pensions from past jobs.
23 One plausible explanation for this failure is that individuals eligible for, but not voluntarily contributing to, the 401(k) may
have neglected to report the 401(k) as a separate plan in Section F of the survey.18
records in each self-/firm-reported eligibility cell by household income category.  Cell sizes are
in parentheses.  In panel A, 12.9 percent of households with income less than $20,000 reported
eligible when actually ineligible.  This figure rose with household income.  In panel F, 26.9
percent of households with income greater than $75,000 reported eligible when actually
ineligible.  In contrast, households could have reported not eligible when actually eligible.  In
panel A, 22.1 percent of households with income less than $20,000 reported not eligible when
actually eligible.  This figure fell with household income.  In panel F, 17.3 percent of households
with income greater than $75,000 reported not eligible when actually eligible.
Columns 3 through 8 show the unconditional mean balances for three asset measures for each
eligibility cell.  The unconditional median balances are in square brackets.  The last line of each
panel shows the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test of the null hypothesis of
equal cell asset distributions.  Failure to reject the null hypothesis is evidence that the
measurement error in eligibility was uncorrelated with saving behavior, which suggests previous
estimates of 401(k) saving effects with self-reported eligibility were consistent (subject to the
identifying assumption (3)).  Interestingly, across household income categories in columns 3 and
4, there were no statistically significant differences in the cell distributions of non-401(k)
financial assets.  This suggests that the measurement error in eligibility was not correlated with
non-401(k) financial asset saving.  However, across household income categories in columns 5
and 6, there were statistically significant differences in the cell distributions of total financial
assets.  Both at the mean and median, households who reported not eligible, but were actually
eligible, had relatively low total financial assets.
25   These “low” savers were attributed
erroneously to the ineligible group in analyses with self-reported eligibility.  In contrast, both at
the mean and median, households who reported eligible, but were actually ineligible, had
                                                                                                                                                            
24 Gustman and Steinmeier (1999b) in the HRS used matched firm-records to estimate the offset to household saving from private
pensions, but did not focus on 401(k)s specifically.
25 Indeed, they appear similar to those who correctly reported they were ineligible.19
relatively high total financial assets.
26   These “high” savers were attributed erroneously to the
eligible group in analyses with self-reported eligibility.  Heuristically, this clearly biased toward
finding a positive 401(k) saving effect when the test is based on total financial assets, as in the
previous literature.
27
This description is heuristic because, technically, the bias from using self-reported eligibility
depends on the size of assets shifted between cells weighted by the percent of the sample in each
cell shown in columns 1 and 2.  But as described above, the percent of the sample in each cell
changed as income rose.  This implies that the bias is differential by income category. For
example, for households with income less than $20,000 (panel A), the “low” savers mistakenly
attributed to the ineligible group were 22.1 percent of the sample, whereas the “high” savers
mistakenly attributed to the eligible group were 12.9 percent of the sample.  In comparison, for
households with income greater than $75,000 (panel F), the “low” savers mistakenly attributed to
the ineligible group in analyses with self-reported eligibility were 17.3 percent of the sample,
whereas the “high” savers mistakenly attributed to the eligible group were 26.9 percent of the
sample.  So, the measurement error bias, while positive for all income categories, is expected to
be greater for higher-income households than lower-income households.  This is born out in the
analysis of conditional median balances in Tables 6 and 7 below.
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 5 suggest that the correlation of the measurement error and saving
is even more complex.  These columns show mean and median cell balances for total financial
and pension assets.  In four of the six household income categories, there are statistically
significant differences (at the nine percent level or less) in the cell distributions of total financial
and pension assets.  The largest p-value is only 0.20.  This suggests that the measurement error is
correlated with total financial and pension asset saving.  But the cell patterns across income
                                                
26 Indeed, they appear similar to those who correctly reported they were eligible.20
categories are now quite different than those in columns 5 and 6.  For households with income
under $30,000, those who reported not eligible, but were actually eligible, had relatively high
median total financial and pension assets. This was because they had non-401(k) pension assets.
These tended to be households with a defined benefit plan and a 401(k) who did not report the
401(k).  For households with income under $30,000, those who reported eligible, but were
actually ineligible, had relatively low total financial and pension assets.  In contrast, for
households with income over $50,000, those who reported not eligible, but were actually
eligible, had relatively low median total financial and pension assets. For households with
income over $50,000, those who reported eligible, but were actually ineligible, had relatively
high total financial and pension assets.
4.4.  Empirical Results with the Firm-Reported Eligibility
This section presents new estimates of the effect of 401(k)s on household saving using the
firm-reported eligibility in the HRS.  The primary sample consists of the 1,312 households that
had matched firm pension records on all pension-covered jobs (i.e., those that appeared in panel
A of Table 3 and in Tables 4 and 5) plus all households that had no pension coverage during
their lifetime.  These additional 925 households were ineligible for a 401(k) and had zero
pension wealth.  Thus, the primary sample consists of 2,237 (=1,312+925) households, or 51.8
percent of the original sample of 4,318 households used in analysis with the self-reported data in
Table 2.
Recall, there were no economic or statistically significant 401(k) effects in the self-reported
data in Table 2. As a benchmark, equation (2) was re-estimated using self-reported eligibility,
but on the sample of 2,237 household for which firm-reported eligibility is measured.  The
implied conditional median total financial and pension assets by eligibility and income are
                                                                                                                                                            
27 Note that the difference between non-401(k) and total financial assets is 401(k) assets (and IRAs).  This implies that the assets
that are being shifted between cells in columns 5 and 6 due to the measurement error are truly non-401(k) pension assets that
households incorrectly self-reported as 401(k) assets.21
shown in Table 6.  In general, the results are similar to those in Table 2.  There are no differences
between eligible and ineligible households in non-401(k) financial assets and large differences in
total financial assets in panels B and A of Table 6, respectively.  Panels C and D of Table 6 show
total financial and pension assets and non-401(k) pension assets, respectively.
28  Five of the six
differences were positive between eligible and ineligible households in total financial and
pension assets, but four of these were not statistically significant.  There were statistically
significant differences for households with income in the $40,000-50,000 and $50,000-75,000
categories, but in the former, ineligible households actually had more assets than eligible
households.  Across income categories, there is little statistical evidence of a 401(k) saving
effect.
29
The amount of new household saving is shown at the bottom of the table.  In contrast to
Table 2, five of these estimates are positive.  However, the two statistically significant estimates,
for households with income between $40,000 and $50,000 and between $50,000 and $75,000,
respectively, are implausibly large in absolute value.  The dollar-weighted new household saving
per dollar of 401(k) wealth was 0.71.  The standard error associated with this estimate was 45
cents.   In an absolute sense, this estimate is much larger than that from Table 2 of 15 cents,
which, importantly, suggests that sample selection alone may have an important role in estimates
of the effectiveness of 401(k)s.
The analyses in Tables 3 through 5 predicted that measurement error in eligibility biased
upward the estimated 401(k) saving effect based on a comparison of total financial assets.  To
isolate the effect of measurement error in eligibility on the estimates, Table 7 presents
                                                
28 The conditional median balances for these asset categories are somewhat higher in Table 6 than Table 2 for the four largest
income categories.  This is consistent with Gustman and Steinmeier (1999c) who found that, even conditional on income and
other factors, the probability of a household having had a matched firm pension record increased non-linearly with the amount of
self-reported pension assets.
29  Table 2 presented results for additional measures of wealth, including Social Security.    Results for additional measures of
wealth that included non-financial assets, such as housing, were similar to those in Table 2 and not reported.  The restricted data
access agreement governing the use of the HRS firm pension records and Social Security records does not allow the firm-22
conditional median asset balances by eligibility on the current job and household income
categories using firm-reported eligibility.   That is, the only difference between Tables 6 and 7 is
in the measure of eligibility.  A comparison of Tables 6 and 7 confirms this prediction.  Like the
results in Table 6, those in panel A of Table 7 show that eligible households had greater total
financial assets than ineligible households in five of the six income categories.  However, unlike
Table 6, the magnitudes of the differences were substantially less; in fact, between two and four
times less.  In addition, only the difference for households with income less than $20,000 was
statistically significant.
Recall, that households who reported not eligible, but were actually eligible, had relatively
low total financial assets.  These “low” savers were attributed erroneously to the ineligible group
with self-reported eligibility in Table 6.  In Table 7, these households have been moved into the
eligible group, and pulled down that group’s median.  On the other hand, households who
reported eligible, but were actually ineligible, had relatively high total financial assets.  These
“high” savers were attributed erroneously to the eligible group in Table 6.  In Table 7, these
households have been moved into the ineligible group, and pulled up that group’s median.
Importantly, the assets that are being shifted in this case are truly non-401(k) pension assets that
households incorrectly self-reported as 401(k) assets because they misreported eligibility.  Once
eligibility is measured correctly, the conditional medians were more similar, so much so that
there were no statistical differences for all income categories except the lowest.  On an economic
basis, though, the differences in panel A still represent a substantial portion of mean 401(k)
wealth shown by income category at the bottom of the table.
Table 5 also showed that the measurement error in eligibility was uncorrelated with non-
401(k) financial asset saving.  This was confirmed in panel B of Table 7.  The differences in non-
                                                                                                                                                            
reported 401(k) eligibility measures from Peticolas (1999) to be linked to the Social Security wealth data.  Hence, estimation with
wealth measures that included Social Security could not be performed.23
401(k) financial assets were small, not statistically different from zero, and quite similar in
magnitude to those in Table 6.
A third prediction from Tables 3 through 5 was that the measurement error bias was
differential by income and dependent on non-401(k) pension assets.  In panel C of Table 7, the
asset measure is total financial and pension assets.  For the lower three income categories,
eligible households had higher balances than ineligible households, although the differences
were statistically different from zero only for households with income between $20,000 and
$30,000.  In contrast, for the upper three income categories, eligible households had lower
balances than ineligible households, and the differences were statistically different from zero (at
the ten percent level or less) for households with income between $40,000 and $50,000 and
greater than $75,000, respectively.
The implied saving effects are shown at the bottom of the table.  They are implausibly large
and positive for lower-income households and implausibly large and negative for higher-income
households.  A comparison of these effects with those at the bottom of Table 6 indicates that
incorrect measurement of eligibility biased 401(k) saving effects based on total financial and
pension assets downward for lower-income households and upward for higher-income
households.  Effectively, this tilted the estimated saving-income profile.
An examination of panels D in Tables 6 and 7, respectively, provides a clear explanation.
Households who reported not eligible, but were actually eligible, had significant non-401(k)
pension assets.   Recall from Table 4 that these were predominantly households with defined
benefit plans and 401(k)s, but likely did not report being eligible because they were not
contributing to the 401(k).  In Table 7, these households have been moved into the eligible group
and raised that group’s median non-401(k) pension assets (panel D).  But because there were
relatively more of these households in the lower-income categories, as shown in Table 5, the
movement of these households into the eligible group had a larger effect in raising non-401(k)24
pension assets for lower- than higher-income eligible households.  On the other hand, households
who reported eligible, but were actually ineligible, had significant non-401(k) pension assets. In
Table 7, these households have been moved into the ineligible group and pulled up that group’s
median non-401(k) pension assets (panel D).  But because there were relatively more of these
households in the higher-income categories, as shown in Table 5, the movement of these
households into the ineligible group had a larger effect in raising non-401(k) pension assets for
higher- than lower-income ineligible households.    These differential effects clearly show how
the measurement error tilted the estimated saving-income profile.  The dollar-weighted new
household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth in Table 7 is minus one dollar and 28 cents, with a
standard error of 68 cents.
4.5.  Measurement Error in Pension Assets
The estimated saving effects shown at the bottom of Table 7 are implausibly large in absolute
value.  Issues about precision notwithstanding, one might speculate that these estimates
themselves suggest a failed specification test for the eligibility experiment framework.  However,
like all of the previous literature, the analysis in Tables 2 through 7 relied on self-reported
pension assets. The primary advantage of such assets is that they represent what the household
believed its pension entitlement to have been.  To the extent forward-looking models of saving
behavior are based on expectations, then self-reported pension assets are an appropriate measure
[Gale (1995, 1998), Lusardi (1999), Feldstein (1978)].
Nonetheless, there are important reasons to believe that measurement error in pension assets
might be severe.  First, individuals may not have reported plan values accurately.  This may have
been especially severe for defined benefit plans, which rely on, sometimes complicated, formulas
based on salary, age, years of service, early and normal retirement dates, etc., of which the
individual may not be well aware. Even small errors in reporting the early and normal retirement
dates can change the implied accrual profile and present value calculation dramatically.  This25
would have resulted in dependent variable measurement error for those specifications above
based on total financial and pension assets.  Participants in defined contribution plans may have
had better knowledge of their account balances, and, hence, less reporting error for plan values.
Second, measurement error in reported plan type, as documented in Table 4, almost surely was
correlated highly with error in reported plan value.  In this sense, the explanatory variable
measurement error likely exacerbated the dependent variable measurement error.  Gustman and
Steinmeier (1999c) examined measurement error in the HRS pension data extensively and found
these patterns of measurement error in pension assets.
30  Third, the self-reported pension assets
used above contained many missing values that ultimately were imputed.  Specifically, Venti and
Wise (1997) reported almost 40 percent of HRS households had to have had at least one piece of
information imputed in order to construct the self-reported pension wealth used.  This resulted in
additional measurement error.
The key issue, then, is to determine the extent to which better measurement of pension assets
can make the estimates in Table 7 more plausible.  In some respects, the HRS is well suited to
address measurement error in pension assets.  It administered a Pension Provider Survey (PPS)
to and attempted to obtain Summary Plan Descriptions (SPD) for all pensions from employers of
all individuals that self-reported a (current or past) pension-covered job.  Importantly, these
matched firm data do not have individual-level information on contributions or balances, rather
only contain plan type, eligibility rules, benefit formulae, employer contribution rates, early and
normal retirement dates and other information described in the Summary Plan Description.
These are useful especially for the calculation of defined benefit assets and defined contribution
assets due to mandatory employer and employee contributions.
To gauge the importance of measurement error in pension assets, Table 8 presents
conditional median asset balances by firm-reported eligibility on the current job and household
                                                
30 Mitchell (1988), Gustman and Steinmeier (1989), Starr-McCluer and Sunden (1999) have examined error in self-reported26
income categories for the HRS firm-reported pension assets on the same sample of 2,237
households from Tables 6 and 7.
31   The measure of pension assets is the present value of claims
to assets in defined benefit and defined contribution plans and the present value of any
annuitized pensions based on the firm-reported data.  Specifically, it is pension wealth scenario 1
from the HRS Pension Present Value Database (Level 1) by Peticolas and Steinmeier (1999) and
is described in more detail in Appendix A.
The results in panel A show that eligible households had greater total financial assets than
ineligible households for the firm-reported sample. These differences were economically large
and statistically significant.  Also, the differences in non-IRA-401(k) financial assets were small
and not statistically significant (panel B).  In panel C, the asset measure is total financial and
private pension assets. In contrast to the results in Tables 2, 6, and 7, there are statistically
significant differences in total financial and pension assets between eligible and ineligible
households in the lower-income categories.  For example, 401(k)-eligible households with
incomes less than $20,000 had $7,134 more in total financial and pension assets than ineligible
households.  This difference was statistically significant at the 7 percent level.  Eligible
households with incomes in the $20,000-30,000 and the $30,000-$40,000 categories had $29,429
and $35,992, respectively, more in total financial and pension assets than ineligible households,
with both differences statistically significant.   Although positive, there were no statistically
significant differences for the highest three income categories.
The estimates of new household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth are substantial for lower-
to-middle income households: 91, 78, and 95 cents for households with income less than
$20,000, $20,000-30,000, and $30,000-40,000, respectively.  Importantly, this effect attenuates
with income.  For households with $50,000-75,000 in income, the household saving effect is
                                                                                                                                                            
pension values in the SCF.
31 As above, these were calculated using the median regression parameter estimates from (2) evaluated at the mean of the
demographic variables in the firm-reported sample.27
estimated as 1 cent.  This pattern of declining saving effects with income is consistent with the
recent findings of Engen and Gale (2000), who used self-reported 401(k) information from the
SIPP.  In addition, it is not inconsistent with the view that higher-income households have had
greater opportunities or incentives for substitution between components of wealth.   While large,
the saving effects for the lower-to-middle income households are similar in magnitude to those
found by Engelhardt (1996) for a Canadian tax subsidy to saving and Venti and Wise (1986,
1990b) for IRA’s.
32   The “dollar-weighted” average new household saving per dollar of 401(k)
wealth was 0.38.  That is, 38 cents of the average dollar in a 401(k) represented new household
saving. The standard error associated with this estimate was 16 cents.  The 95 percent confidence
interval for the household saving effect is from 6 to 70 cents. This point estimate is significantly
lower than that implied by the Poterba, Venti, and Wise studies and slightly higher than the
largest estimate (30 cents) in Engen and Gale (2000).
Unfortunately, there is very little information in the matched firm records that would allow
for the accurate calculation of individual balances in voluntary contributory plans like 401(k)s.
Peticolas and Steinmeier (1999) calculated voluntary employee contributions by assuming that
the individual had contributed at the self-reported voluntary contribution rate in 1992 (wave 1)
for each past year eligible (i.e., contribution rates were time-invariant).
33  If the contribution rate
was missing in 1992, the individual was imputed to have contributed each year at a 5 percent
rate, the sample mean contribution rate for those with non-missing values.  Clearly, these
assumptions likely mean that firm-reported exceeds actual 401(k) wealth.  Indeed, for the sub-
sample of 257 households that both were self- and firm-reported 401(k)-eligible, the ratio of
sample mean firm- to self-reported 401(k) wealth was 2.6.  In addition, 80 percent of these
households had firm-reported 401(k) wealth that exceeded self-reported 401(k) wealth.
                                                
32 However, the estimates for IRA’s have been a subject of much debate [Bernheim (1997, 1999), Hubbard and Skinner (1996),
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1996, 1998a),  Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996)].
33 See Madrian and Shea (2000) and Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1998) for analyses of 401(k) contribution behavior across time.28
There are some important implications.  First, for households that correctly reported their
pension plan type, there likely was less measurement error in self-reported than firm-reported
defined contribution assets.  Second, for those that incorrectly reported plan type, the firm-
reported defined contribution assets significantly overstate actual, but unobserved, defined
contribution assets.  Third, if actual voluntary contribution rates varied around the average of 5
percent by income level (e.g., higher contribution rates at higher income levels), then the degree
of overstatement will be differential by income level.  Finally, if the frequency of missing values
in contribution rates, and, therefore, imputations in the firm data, varied by income level (e.g.,
more imputations at lower income levels), then the degree of overstatement will be differential
by income level.
Consequently, equation (2) was estimated using the following pension asset data (in the
dependent variable): firm-reported data for all defined benefit plans; firm-reported data for all
incorrectly self-reported defined contribution plans (i.e., reported a defined benefit when actually
had a defined contribution plan); and, self-reported data for all correctly self-reported defined
contribution plans.  This minimizes the error in defined benefit and correctly self-reported
defined contribution assets.  However, it should be emphasized that defined contribution assets
are still overstated for those that failed to correctly self-report defined contribution plans.
The conditional median total financial and pension assets by eligibility and income categories
are shown in Table 9. The differences between eligible and ineligible households are less
precisely estimated.  Household saving effects from 401(k)s are large for lower-income
households and attenuate as income rises.  In fact, 401(k)s crowd in saving at a ratio of 2.5:1 for
households with income under $20,000.  These effects are even negative for higher-income
households, although not statistically different from zero. The estimated dollar-weighted average
household saving effect is minus 8 cents with a standard error of 29 cents.  This is substantially
lower than the estimate of 38 cents in Table 8 that used firm-reported plan values for all29
households.   Importantly, a comparison of mean 401(k) wealth by income category in Tables 8
and 9 clearly shows that firm-reported 401(k) assets likely greatly overstates actual 401(k) assets.
The average ratio of mean 401(k) in Table 8 to Table 9 is 2:1.
Table 10 reports conditional median total financial and pension assets by eligibility and
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Because defined contribution assets are overstated for those that failed to correctly self-report
defined contribution plans, equation (4) modifies (2) by adding a dummy variable, 
DCError
i D , that
is one if the household failed to correctly report a defined contribution plan and zero otherwise.
This dummy directly accounts for this overstatement, and the effect is allowed to vary with
income category.  The results are similar to those in Table 9.  However, now the estimated
saving effect in the lowest income category, 1.04, is more plausible.
34
5.  Corroborating Evidence on Plan Substitution
Overall, there is little effect of 401(k)s on household saving.  Because there appears to have
been no substitution within financial assets and 401(k) eligibility was inversely correlated with
other pension assets, the results imply significant firm-level substitution of 401(k) for other
pension assets.  This section briefly discusses findings from the previous literature that
corroborate these findings.
One of the most striking developments in workplace compensation in the last two decades
has been the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution pensions.  As Figure 1 clearly
shows, participation in defined benefit plans has fallen dramatically, while that for defined
contribution plans, and 401(k)s, in particular, has risen dramatically. Although there is debate as
to the cause of this shift [Clark and McDermed (1990), Gustman and Steinmeier (1992), Kruse30
(1995)], the figure makes it clear that, because most of the growth in defined contribution plans
has been due to 401(k)s, one potential explanation for the findings in Tables 2 and 6 through 10
is firm-level substitution of 401(k)s for other pensions.
Papke (1999) identified four pathways for plan substitution, of which three are explicit, and
the fourth, implicit.  First, firms may have replaced existing defined benefit plans with 401(k)s.
Papke (1999) examined IRS Form 5500 filings for firms with defined benefit plans in 1985.  She
compared those to the 1992 filings for the same firms.  On average, for every defined benefit
plan terminated, three 401(k) plans were created.  This implied 33 percent substitution.
35
Second, firms may have replaced existing defined contribution plans with 401(k)s.  In
particular, many after-tax thrift and savings plans may have been converted to 401(k)s to capture
the benefits of pre-tax saving.  Andrews (1992) has provided striking evidence of this from Form
5500 filings.  Only 1,703 401(k) plans existed in 1983.  In 1987, there were 45,054 such plans.
But of these, 15,689 had been established before 1984.  This implied that 13,986 401(k) plans (or
31%) in 1987 were converted from some other pension type.  Andrews claimed the bulk of these
conversions were from after-tax thrift plans.  Papke (1999) has provided further evidence.  From
1985 to 1992, on average, for every defined contribution plan terminated, three 401(k)s were
created.  The evidence of Andrews and Papke combined suggest a significant fraction of 401(k)
plans have been converted from other pensions.
One shortcoming of these studies has been the focus on plan rather than pension asset
substitution.  If the distribution of pension plan assets is skewed (to a relatively small number of
plans), there could have been little substitution of pension plan assets toward 401(k)s even if
many plans were substituted.  Based on Form 5500 filings from 1984-95, Benjamin (2000)
                                                                                                                                                            
34 Appendix B describes sensitivity analysis of the results in Tables 8 through 10 to a number of alternative specifications and
samples.  The results were very robust.
35 Papke, Petersen, and Poterba (1996) also examined 401(k) substitution for defined benefit plans.  They found very little
substitution based on a mail/phone survey of 43 firms.  Unfortunately, these firms represented just 5.5% of the 786 firms
contacted in the original survey.   Although the results are interesting, the low response rate raises concerns about how their
results generalize to the population of firms.31
calculated for 1992 that 32 percent of aggregate assets in 401(k) plans were converted from other
plans.   Based on Form 5500 filings, Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996) reported that, in 1985, 85
percent of 401(k) balances, 39 percent of plans, 65 percent of participants, and 66 percent of
contributions were from plans created before 1982 and thought to have been conversions of non-
401(k) plans.  However, these figures have declined in magnitude over time.  Specifically, they
also reported that, in 1991, the majority of balances, 42 percent of participants, and 47 percent of
contributions were from plans created before 1982 and thought to have been conversions of non-
401(k) plans.
Third, with the advent of 401(k)s, firms may have kept existing plans, but added 401(k)s as
supplements and channeled all additional pension resources to 401(k)s.  In general, there has
been little convincing empirical evidence for this, although numerous anecdotes suggest some
firms capped existing defined benefit plans when they adopted a 401(k).  However, Figure 1
plots the time path of participation in supplemental defined contribution plans, most of which
currently are 401(k)s.  Interestingly, the fraction of the work force covered by such plans has
remained remarkably constant across time.  There was rise in such plans beginning in 1981, the
year that the IRS issued clarifying regulations for 401(k)s, but no growth since 1984.  Although
there may be other interpretations, this may suggest most 401(k)s that currently are supplemental
plans were conversions.  It also suggests that most of the growth in 401(k)s has been as primary
plans.
Fourth, new firms since (or existing firms predating) the expansion of 401(k)s in 1981, first
deciding to offer a pension after 1981 may have adopted 401(k)s when they otherwise would
have adopted a defined benefit or non-401(k) defined contribution plan in the absence of the
401(k) program.  This can be characterized as implicit substitution.  Unfortunately, because this
is a counterfactual, it is not possible to know the magnitude of this form of substitution.32
The results in Tables 2 and 6 through 10 suggested significant substitution of 401(k) for other
pension assets.  Overall, evidence from the existing literature using Form 5500 data is not
inconsistent with significant substitution having occurred.  However, given the debate in the
pension literature over the causes of the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution plans,
other interpretations may apply.
7.  Conclusion
The paper has a number of very important implications for research on pensions and saving.
First, 401(k) eligibility is not exogenous with respect to other pensions. There appears to have
been significant substitution of 401(k) for other pension assets.  The incorporation of all pension
assets gives a decidedly dimmer view of the household saving effects from 401(k)s.  Second, the
wide range of estimated saving effects implies that, with the right mix of sample, eligibility, and
pension asset measure, virtually any prior about the effect of 401(k)s and saving could be
confirmed.  Third, measurement error in eligibility matters.  All of the previous literature used
self-reported eligibility, which exhibits significant measurement error.  This error has biased the
estimated 401(k) saving effects upward significantly and differentially by income category.
Fourth, measurement error in pension assets matters.  The combination of correctly measured
eligibility and self-reported pension assets yielded implausible results.  Plausible results were
obtained only when pension assets were measured more accurately.  Fifth, access to matched
firm pension records is critical for the analysis of pensions and saving.  Finally, and ironically,
perhaps the greatest weakness of this study is that even for all its emphasis on the importance of
measurement error, in the end, 401(k) wealth, the object of study, is the most poorly measured.
This highlights the need for improvements in survey methodology to better measure 401(k)
pension assets.33
Overall, the best estimates in this paper suggest that 401(k)s have not raised household
saving.  Unfortunately, the estimate most favorable to a modest saving effect (38 cents in Table
8) used the least plausible firm-reported pension assets.  All of the estimates are significantly
lower than those implied by the Poterba, Venti, and Wise studies but similar to those in Engen
and Gale (2000).  They also constrast with the findings of Engelhardt (1996) and Venti and Wise
(1986, 1990) for other tax subsidies to saving.
36  One plausible explanation for the large
estimated offset to household saving is firm-level substitution of 401(k)s for other pensions.  In
addition, even though very little of the average dollar of 401(k) wealth appears to be new
household saving, specifications in which eligibility and pension assets were more accurately
measured  (Tables 8 through 10) indicated 401(k)s may have stimulated saving significantly for
lower-to-middle income households and, hence, increased retirement income security for an
important segment of the population.
There are important caveats to this study.  First, the HRS samples used consist primarily of
individuals born in 1931-41.  Because households of all ages were not included, this study’s
findings may not apply to other, particularly younger, birth cohorts, for which it is possible there
may be larger saving effects.  Second, the estimated saving effects in the best specifications
(Tables 8 through 10) showed some sensitivity to how pension assets were measured.  Because
there is currently no completely acceptable way to measure pension assets, especially 401(k)
assets, it is conceivable that alternative measures of pension assets not used here could imply a
positive true saving effect, although the results in this paper make it likely to be small.  Finally,
because it is very difficult to conceive of an empirical strategy to illustrate convincingly there is
no relationship between 401(k) eligibility and tastes for saving, this study adopted the eligibility
experiment methodology.  Specifically, it maintained the assertion that eligibility conditional on
                                                
36 Because the best estimates in this paper suggest that 401(k)s have not raised household saving, the effect on national saving
was not explored because it would be expected to be zero or even negative.  However, Appendix C does present the results of34
income and demographics is not correlated with tastes for saving.  It should be emphasized that
this is just an assertion, and that many of the criticisms of this approach in the previous literature
still may be valid here.
                                                                                                                                                            
stylized simulations of the effect on government revenue and national saving for the upper-bound household saving estimate of
38 cents from Table 8.  The interested reader is referred there.35
Appendix A: Data and Variable Descriptions
Self-Reported Information on 401(k)-Type Arrangements - Detailed questions on pensions on the
current job were posed to respondents and spouses in Section F of the HRS questionnaire.
Individuals were asked first if they were “included” in a pension, retirement, or tax-deferred
savings plan (Question F37):
“Now I'd like to ask about pension or retirement plans on your job,  sponsored by
your employer or union.  This includes not only basic pension or retirement plans,
but also tax-deferred plans like thrift, savings, 401k, deferred profit sharing, or
stock ownership plans.  Are you included in any such pension, retirement, or tax-
deferred plan with this employer? [IF RESPONDENT MENTIONS IRA OR
KEOGH PLANS, NOTE IN MARGIN AND SAY: “We will ask about these later
in the interview.  Here, I just want to find out about other plans operated through
your employer.”]”
If the individual answered “yes,” then detailed questions followed about each plan for that job,
up to 3 plans.  This self-reported information included the type of plan, e.g., formula-based (DB),
account-based (DC), or combination.
37
Those with a DC plan were asked to identify the type.  The questionnaire listed five potential
answers: thrift or savings; 401(k)/403(b)/SRA; profit-sharing; stock purchase/employee stock
option (ESOP); and, other.
38  In the public use version of the HRS, the “other” category
responses were coded: annuity (including tax-deferred, such as TIAA-CREF); money purchase
plan; IRA-SEP; simplified employee pension plan (SEPP); combinations of 401(k)/403(b)/SRA
and profit-sharing; combinations of thrift or savings and stock purchase/ESOP; combinations of
401(k)/403(b)/SRA and stock purchase/ESOP; and, other.  In the current paper, plans self-
reported as combinations of 401(k)/403(b)/SRA and thrift or savings were considered 401(k)-
type arrangements.  This is the same definition as used by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994,
1995).  Those self-reported as combinations of profit-sharing and stock purchase/ESOP were
considered profit-sharing plans.
For those individuals not “included” in a pension or retirement plan (Question F37), some
additional questions followed (Questions F37a-f).  The sequence of these questions is depicted in
Figure A-1.  These included whether the employer offered any such plans (Question F37a) and,
if so, whether the individual was eligible to be included in these plans (Question F37b).
39
Unfortunately, the HRS did not ask what type of plans these were.  However, tabulations in the
1995 Survey of Consumer Finances found over 80% of individuals that reported they were not
“included” in, but were eligible for, a pension were actually eligible for a 401(k).  Pence (1999)
had a similar finding.  Therefore, all HRS individuals that reported they were not included but
were offered a pension plan were deemed 401(k)-eligible.
Sample Selection and Comparison of Self-Reported 401(k) Eligibility - A sample of households
from the 1992 HRS (Wave 1) was drawn.  Each household contained at least one individual with
a current job who reported they were not self-employed (Question F3).  This selection rule was
similar to that of previous studies.  The final sample consisted of 4,318 households.  Using the
                                                
37 In addition, questions were asked about the number of years included in the plan, the amount of the employer contribution, the
amount of the employee contribution, and the balance in the plan.  If the individual had more than three plans on the current job,
then the sum of the balances on the fourth and higher plans was asked as well.
38 If the response fell in the “other” category, the type of plan was noted.
39 The actual wording for these questions was “Does your employer offer any such plans?” and “Are you eligible to be included
in any of these plans?,” respectively.36
HRS household-level analysis weights, these households represented 10,267,886 aggregate
households age 51-61.  Of these, 1463 were eligible for a 401(k)-type arrangement.  Using the
HRS household-level analysis weights, these households represented 3,580,927 aggregate
households age 51-61.
The first row of panel A of Table A-1 shows the percentage of households eligible for a
401(k) under this paper’s definition.  All figures were calculated using the HRS household-level
analysis sampling weights.  Overall, 35 percent of households 51 to 61 years old were eligible.
Similar to the findings of previous studies, such as Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994, 1995,
1998a), eligibility rose with household income.  Importantly, these tabulations are broadly
consistent with those for households of similar age shown in rows 2-5 of panel A from various
waves of the SIPP and CPS done by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995, 1998a).  This gives some
confidence that the measurement method for eligibility was not unreasonable.
The first row of panel B shows the percentage of eligible households that participated in a
401(k), where “participated” means having made a contribution to a 401(k) during the survey
year.
40  Almost 74 percent of eligible households 51 to 61 years old participated.  In addition, the
first row in panel C shows the percentage of all households that participated.  About 26 percent
of these households participated.  Similar to the findings of previous studies, participation
measured in panels B and C rose with household income.  These tabulations are broadly
consistent with those for households of similar age from various waves of the SIPP and CPS.
As a comparison, panel D shows the percentage of households with an IRA.  A total of 44.5
percent of households 51 to 61 had an IRA.  IRA participation rose with income as well. A
comparison of panels C and D indicates that overall more households participated in IRA's than
in 401(k)s.  However, a comparison of panels B and D indicates that participation was greater for
401(k)s than IRA's among eligible households.
Self-Reported Pension Assets – Self-reported pension assets are the present value of the
household’s claims to assets in defined benefit and defined contribution plans and the present
value of any annuitized pensions.  It captures pension assets on current and past jobs.  It was
calculated by Venti and Wise (1997) from the self-reported pension information in wave 1 of the
HRS.
Firm-Reported Pension Information – The HRS administered a Pension Provider Survey (PPS)
to and attempted to obtain Summary Plan Descriptions (SPD) for all pensions from employers of
all individuals that self-reported working in a pension-covered job.
41  Specifically, for those
working in wave 1, the current employer and the employer from the most recent past job that
lasted at least five years were contacted.  For those retired, the last employer and the employer
from the most recent job that lasted at least five years prior to the last were contacted.  In terms
of the HRS survey instrument, these employers corresponded to the pension-covered job in
Section F and the first pension-covered job in section H for those working in wave 1, and to the
pension-covered job in Section G and the first pension-covered job in Section H for those retired
in wave 1.  Employers from the second and third jobs in Section H were not contacted.  See
Gustman and Steinmeier (1999c) for a detailed explanation.  The match rates were 65% (or 2896
jobs) of those working in pension-covered jobs in wave 1, 66% (or 915 jobs) for the last job for
those not working in wave 1, and 35% (or 994 jobs) for jobs held five years or longer prior to the
current (last) job for those working (not working).  These matched firm data do not have
                                                
40 Alternatively, a household could have been defined as having participated if it had had a positive 401(k) balance regardless of
current contribution status.  The first definition was adopted to be consistent with previous studies.
41 Unfortunately, the HRS did not contact employers of individuals that self-reported no pension coverage on the job, so that the
firm-reported data cannot shed light on the extent to which individuals misreported their pension coverage status on the job.37
individual-level information on contributions or balances, rather only contain plan type,
eligibility rules, benefit formulae, employer contribution rates, early and normal retirement dates
and other information described in the Summary Plan Description.
Social Security Assets - The measure used came from two sources. First, there were matched
Social Security earnings histories for 9,029 respondents.  For these individuals with, Social
Security wealth came from the restricted access Earnings and Benefits File (EBF) for the 1992
HRS from the Social Research Center at the University of Michigan.  The calculation of the
Social Security assets in the EBF is described in Mitchell, Olson, and Steinmeier (1996).  For
individuals without matched records, Social Security wealth was imputed using self-reported
information on earnings histories in the 1992 and 1996 HRS (waves 1 and 3) following the
method in Gustman and Steinmeier (1999a).
Firm-Reported 401(k) Eligibility - Peticolas (1999) developed a dataset of variables from the
matched firm data that indicated whether the individual had been eligible for a tax-deferred
voluntary retirement savings plan.  For each pension, it was determined whether the employer
provided such a plan and whether it had been available to the individual at the time of the wave 1
interview for current jobs and at the time of past employment for past jobs.  For the purposes of
this study, those cases that were determined definitively that the individual had been eligible for
such a plan were deemed “401(k)-eligible” based on the firm data.  Specifically, I used the
“Deferred Tax Voluntary Retirement Savings Available” flag in the Peticolas (1999) data to
measure 401(k) eligibility. There are cases, particularly for matched records with past employers,
in which tax-deferred retirement savings plans were introduced after the individual left the firm
(measured by the “Plan Inception Subsequent to Respondent’s Tenure” variable) as well as cases
in which there was not enough information in the matched records to determine definitively
whether such a plan had been available (measured by the “Insufficient Information to Determine
Availability” variable).  These variables were not used to determine 401(k) eligibility.
Firm-Reported Pension Assets - This measure is the present value of claims to assets in defined
benefit and defined contribution plans and the present value of any annuitized pensions based on
the firm-reported data.  It is from the Pension Present Value Database (Level 1) by Peticolas and
Steinmeier (1999). This database contains the present value of claims to pensions under nine
different interest rate/wage growth/inflation scenarios.  Present values used here were calculated
according to the baseline scenario (Scenario 1) which assumed a nominal interest rate of 6.3
percent, annual nominal wage growth of 5 percent, and annual inflation rate of 4 percent.  The
other 8 scenarios represent departures from this baseline.  See Peticolas and Steinmeier (1999)
for details.   It should be emphasized that the firm-reported data may provide a rather poor
measure of DC wealth. The firm-reported data do not have individual-level information on
contributions or balances in DC plans.  Instead, they only contain DC plan type (401(k), non-
401(k), etc.), eligibility rules, employer contribution rates, etc. There is very little information
that would allow for the accurate calculation of individual balances in voluntary contributory
plans such as 401(k)s.Are you participating in a
retirement program?
Which program? Are you eligible for
a program?



























Question asked in 1995 survey only.
Contains both eligible and ineligible households.





Source: Author’s adaptation of Pence (1999) Appendix B.
Note: N refers to the number of observations in that cell in 1995 the SCF.38
TABLE A-1
IRA and 401(k) Participation Rates and Eligibility by Age

























A.  Percentage of Households Eligible for a 401(k)
1992 HRS 51 to 61 35.3 7.2 21.4 25.6 32.2 39.5 46.1 55.9
1991 SIPP 45 to 55 35.9 2.1 16.5 27.6 32.8 48.7 56.4 52.5
1991 SIPP 55 to 65 28.9 7.9 14.4 20.9 36.5 37.7 51.9 37.0
1993 SIPP 51 to 61 39.1 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1993 CPS 51 to 61 45.6 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
B.  Percentage of Eligible Households Participating in a 401(k)
1992 HRS 51 to 61 73.8 31.7 52.5 72.1 72.6 69.4 78.5 82.9
1991 SIPP 45 to 55 72.3 72.5 51.5 57.6 58.5 81.6 75.1 88.1
1991 SIPP 55 to 65 72.3 85.2 68.3 49.0 72.5 67.8 84.0 85.7
1993 SIPP 51 to 61 66.9 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1993 CPS 51 to 61 77.0 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
C.  Percentage of Households Participating in a 401(k)
1992 HRS 51 to 61 25.9 2.3 11.2 18.4 23.2 27.3 35.9 46.0
1991 SIPP 45 to 55 25.9 1.5 8.5 15.9 19.2 39.8 42.3 46.3
1991 SIPP 55 to 65 20.9 6.7 9.8 10.2 26.5 25.6 43.6 31.7
1993 SIPP 51 to 61 26.1 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1993 CPS 51 to 61 33.0 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
D.  Percentage of Households with an IRA
1992 HRS 51 to 61 44.5 13.3 22.2 31.4 42.1 46.9 58.7 73.6
1991 SIPP 45 to 55 35.3 6.0 12.9 24.9 31.3 47.3 50.2 66.3
1991 SIPP 55 to 65 43.8 14.8 24.1 37.6 45.7 59.5 63.4 75.5
     
aFollowing Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994), participation is defined as the household having made a contribution
to a 401(k) during the survey year.  Tabulations are weighted using the HRS household-level analysis weights and
based on the sample of 4,318 HRS households described in the text.  When weighted, this sample represents
10,267,886 aggregate households aged 51 to 61 in1992.  The 1991 SIPP tabulations are from Poterba, Venti, and
Wise (1995), Table 2.  The 1993 SIPP and CPS tabulations are from Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1997), Table 6.
Annual household income is in thousands of nominal dollars.39
Appendix B: Additional Sensitivity Analysis
This appendix presents the results of additional specifications that used firm-reported pension
assets.  First, all analyses in the previous literature, and up to here in this paper, have defined
401(k) eligibility based on the pension plan on the current job.  However, as time has elapsed
since the effective inception of 401(k)s in 1981, it is increasingly likely that as individuals
changed jobs, they may not have been eligible based on the current job, but nonetheless have had
exposure to 401(k)s due to eligibility on past jobs.  Because the HRS obtained matched records
for pensions on past jobs, the definition of eligibility can be redefined to all households that were
ever eligible, i.e., on either the current or past jobs.   This was done and equation (2) was re-
estimated using the new eligibility measure on the sample of 2,237 households used.  This did
not change any of the results.
Second, two criteria for inclusion in the samples used in Tables 6 through 10 were that at
least one individual in the household had a current job and was not self-employed.
42  Whereas
the omission of the self-employed is defensible in this context, many households were excluded
because of the lack of a current job due to retirement. Because the 401(k) tax subsidy to saving
produces a substitution effect that raises saving and an income effect that may induce retirement
[Feldstein (1974)], it is possible that some households that were 401(k)-eligible in a past job do
not appear in the sample because they had retired.  Furthermore, if these households were
differentially higher savers because of 401(k)s, then the results in Tables 6 through 10 may be
underestimates of the true household saving effects because the sample selection criteria would
have differentially excluded high-saving 401(k)-eligible households.
To explore this hypothesis, all retired households that were not self-employed on the job
prior to retirement and had matched firm records for their past pension-covered jobs were added
back into the firm-reported sample.  This new sample was composed of the base sample of 2,237
households plus 1,015 retired households, for a total of 3,252 households. Equation (2) was re-
estimated using the eligibility on either the current or past job on the new sample of 3,252
households. The results were similar.  The estimated household saving effects were somewhat
higher for the higher-income categories but not as precisely estimated. Overall, there did not
appear to be strong support for the hypothesis that the estimated household saving effects were
biased downward due to the exclusion of retired households.
43
Finally, the sample used in Tables 6 through 10 contained all households that had matched
firm pension records on all pension-covered jobs.  Although it ensured a sample in which 401(k)
eligibility and pension wealth were measured precisely, this was a strict criterion for inclusion
because of the low match rate (35 percent) on past pension-covered jobs.  Consequently, a new
sample was formed that contained all households that had matched firm pension records on just
the current pension-covered job.
44  This expanded the sample from 2,237 to 3,173 households.
The results from the replication of Tables 8 through 10 with the expanded sample did not differ
qualitatively from those with the smaller sample. In general, the differences between eligible and
ineligible households were less precisely estimated. Household saving effects from 401(k)s were
large for lower-income households and attenuate as income rises. The earlier results appeared
robust to changes in the sample selection criteria.
                                                
42 These were criteria used by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994, 1995) and, in the current paper, were chosen to make the
sample(s) consistent with those used in the previous literature.
43 However, it should be emphasized that this can be viewed as a low-powered test of this hypothesis simply because the retired
households may have been spending down their assets in retirement.
44 That is, if an individual had two pension-covered jobs, then a matched record was needed only on the current job for the
individual to have entered the new sample.  For married households, both spouses needed to have met this new criterion.40
Appendix C: The Effect of 401(k)s on National Saving
This appendix presents stylized estimates of the government revenue loss from the provision
of 401(k)s under the assumption that the household saving effect is the upper-bound estimate of
38 cents per dollar of 401(k) wealth as in Table 8.  This effect on government saving then is
added to the household saving gain to calculate the effect on national saving.
Estimation of the revenue loss is difficult for a number of reasons.  First, the annual revenue
loss depends on the point in the lifecycle. Because each dollar contributed is tax-deductible, the
government loses revenue in the year of contribution.  The revenue loss continues as long as the
individual works and contributions accrue at the pre-tax interest rate.  But when the individual
retires, withdrawals are taxable as ordinary income and government revenue is positive.  In
addition, marginal tax rates are typically lower when retired than working, so that withdrawals
are taxed at a lower rate than when the contributions were made.  All of this requires the revenue
calculations be done in present value.  Second, as is well known in the literature on IRA’s and
401(k)s, the present value of the revenue loss depends crucially on the discount rate and the
marginal tax rates when working and retired.  Third, as Feldstein (1995) and Hubbard and
Skinner (1996) persuasively argued and illustrated, the revenue loss critically depends on how
much 401(k)s add to the capital stock and generate additional corporate income tax revenue.
The calculation of the revenue loss follows Feldstein (1995) and the description in this
paragraph paraphrases his exposition.
45  Consider an individual that begins a 401(k) at age a ,
retires at age 65, and dies at age 79.  Let t index age,  79 ,..., a = t .  The individual contributes  t C
to a 401(k) through age 64 and zero thereafter.  At retirement, the stock of 401(k) wealth is used
to finance a constant annual withdrawal,  t R , through age 79. There are no pre-retirement
withdrawals.
46 Let  t q ,  r , and t  denote the individual’s marginal personal income tax rate, the
real pre-tax rate of return on additions to the corporate capital stock, and the marginal corporate
income tax rate, respectively.   Assume an economy without growth and that all additions to the
corporate capital stock are through equity.  Then Feldstein (1995) derived the revenue effect by
age,  t T , as
r B A rB R C T t t t t t t t ) ( ] ) 1 ( [ - + - + - - = t t q .( 3 )
t A  is wealth accumulated in the 401(k) and is defined as
t t t t R C A r A - + - + = -1 ] ) 1 ( 1 [ t . (4)
t B  is the counterfactual capital stock, i.e., the capital stock that would have been accumulated in
the absence of 401(k)s had  t C  been contributed to a taxable savings vehicle.
47  It is defined as
t t t t t W C B r B - + - - + = - l t q 1 ] ) 1 )( 1 ( 1 [ . (5)
                                                
45 Feldstein (1995) analyzed the revenue loss from fully tax-deductible IRA’s, but his method is applicable to 401(k)s as well.
46 See Engelhardt (1999b), Korczyk (1996), and Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1998c) for analyses of pre-retirement lump-sum
pension distributions in the HRS.
47 I assume that the alternative to a 401(k) is saving in an after-tax saving vehicle, rather than, say, a fully-tax-deductible IRA.  In
practice, eligibility for fully-deductible IRA’s is limited by household adjusted gross income.   See Poterba, Venti, and Wise
(1995) and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994) for analytical comparisons between IRA’s, 401(k)s, and after-tax saving vehicles, as
well as empirical analyses of IRA-401(k) asset substitution.41
Define k  as the fraction of a dollar of 401(k) wealth that is new saving.  l  is the fraction of  a
dollar of 401(k) wealth that would have been saved otherwise, i.e., in the absence of 401(k)s.
Thus,  k l - =1 .  Finally, the counterfactual stock of wealth is used to finance a constant annual
withdrawal,  t W , through age 79.  The terminal conditions are  0 79 = A  and  0 79 = B , respectively.
Equation (3) can be modified slightly to
r B A rB R C T t t t t t t t t t ) ( ] ) 1 [( - + - - + - = t t q q q (6)
to make clear the per period sources of revenue loss.  The first term of the right-hand side of (6)
is the revenue loss from the personal income tax while the individual works because annual
contributions are tax-deductible.  The second term is the revenue gain from the personal income
tax in retirement because withdrawals are fully taxable.  The third term is the revenue loss from
the personal income tax while working because 401(k) funds accumulate at the real pre-tax rate
of return.  The final term is the revenue gain from the corporate income tax due to additions to
the corporate capital stock.
Given parameters values  ) , , , , ( l q t a t r , equations (3)-(5) and the terminal conditions
describe  t T , the age-profile of the revenue loss from the provision of 401(k)s.  Because the
estimated household saving effects, k , in Table 8, as well as marginal personal income tax rates,
t q , vary by household income, an age-profile of the revenue loss was calculated for each
household income category in Table 8.   Specifically, the system was parameterized by
household income category for a representative household according to the category means of
the sample used in Table 8.  First, the average age of the head of household in the sample was 55
and did not vary across income categories.  Second, following Hubbard and Skinner (1996), who
based their calculations on Employee Benefit Research Institute (1994) and Siegel (1992), r  was
assumed to be 5.55%, the average portfolio return from 1900-1990, and constant across income
categories.  Third, it was assumed that the representative household had been eligible for the
401(k) for six years as of 1992, i.e., it began contributing at age 49 (or in 1986), so  49 = a .
48
Fourth, a constant real path of contributions when working was assumed, i.e.,  C Ct = .  For each
income category, the contribution amount was set so that, at the real pre-tax return, r , 55 A  would
match the category mean 401(k) wealth for eligible households at age 55 in the HRS.  Fifth, for
each income category, l  was set equal to one minus that category’s estimated household saving
effect in Table 8.
The marginal tax rates are key parameters in the revenue calculations.  For each income
category, the marginal personal income tax rate, q , was assumed to be constant while working
and equal to the income category mean federal marginal tax rate on the first-dollar of household
capital income in wave 1 (i.e.,1992) of the HRS.  The rate was calculated for each household
using Internet TAXSIM at the NBER. Unfortunately, there has been very little empirical analysis
of the extent to which marginal tax rates decline at retirement.   One exception is Burman, Gale,
and Weiner (1998).  They used a large panel of income tax returns from the Continuous Work
History Survey (CWHS) that allowed them to hold household characteristics fixed.  They
calculated marginal tax rates on IRA contributions and withdrawals by income category under a
number of different tax law, contribution, and withdrawal scenarios. To measure how much
marginal tax rates fall at retirement, for each income category, I used the percentage difference
between marginal tax rates for households that contributed in 1982 and withdrew in 1995 but
were treated as if the 1995 tax law had applied in 1982.  These were taken from Burman, Gale,
                                                
48 This corresponded to the sample mean number of years that households self-reported in Section F they had been “included” in
their 401(k).42
and Weiner (1998), Table 3.  These “constant-law” marginal tax rates provide a clean measure of
the effect of retirement on marginal tax rates holding household characteristics and tax law fixed.
For each income category, I then multiplied the marginal personal income tax rate while working
(defined above) by the respective percentage decline in marginal tax rates to generate a first-
dollar marginal tax rate on capital income while retired.
49  This tax rate was assumed to be
constant while retired.
 Because  t T  varies with point in the lifecycle and the household saving effects in Table 8
applied to a sample in which the average age of the head of 401(k)-eligible households was 55,
the revenue loss is calculated in present value at age 55 for each income category.  Following
Hubbard and Skinner (1996), the discount rate used was 5.55%.  Finally, for each income
category, the present value of the revenue loss is expressed as a fraction of that category’s mean
401(k) wealth for eligible households.  This yields the present value of the revenue loss per
dollar of 401(k) wealth, which is shown in Table C-1 under three different corporate income tax
scenarios.
Panel A shows the case in which the marginal corporate income tax rate is zero.  This is a
baseline in the sense that the effect of 401(k)s on government saving is constrained to come from
the personal income tax only.  The dollar–weighted average household saving effect is 38 cents.
The dollar-weighted average government saving effect is –37 cents.  Therefore, the dollar-
weighted average effect of 401(k)s on national saving is 1 cent.  That is, 401(k)s break even with
respect to the personal income tax.
However, panel A ignores the fact that the household saving effect increases the
corporate capital stock, which generates new corporate income tax revenue.  In panels B and C,
the impact on government saving is recalculated to reflect this corporate tax effect.    As noted in
Feldstein (1995) and Hubbard and Skinner (1996), spillovers to the corporate tax significantly
reduce the revenue loss from 401(k)s.  The results in panel B assumed an effective marginal
corporate income tax rate of 17 percent.  This was half of the statutory rate of 34 percent that
applied in 1992.  In panel B, the dollar-weighted average government saving effect is –27 cents.
Therefore, the dollar-weighted average effect of 401(k)s on national saving is 11 cents.   The
results in panel C assumed the effective marginal corporate income tax rate equaled the statutory
rate.  In panel C, the dollar-weighted average government saving effect is –13 cents.  Therefore,
the dollar-weighted average effect of 401(k)s on national saving is 25 cents.
                                                
49 Burman, Gale, and Weiner (1998) also calculated marginal tax rates on contributions and withdrawals by age category.  As a
sensitivity check, I used the percentage difference in these to construct marginal tax rates when retired and these revenue
simulations produced results very similar to those in Table 9.43
TABLE C-1
Estimates of New National Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth by Household























A.  Zero Effective Corporate Marginal Income Tax Rate
Household 0.91 0.78 0.95 0.53 0.01 0.37 0.52 0.38
Government -0.06 -0.18 -0.17 -0.29 -0.52 -0.39 -0.30 -0.37
National 0.85 0.60 0.78 0.24 -0.51 -0.02 0.22 0.01
B.  17 Percent Effective Corporate Marginal Income Tax Rate
Household 0.91 0.78 0.95 0.53 0.01 0.37 0.52 0.38
Government 0.16 0.01 0.06 -0.15 -0.49 -0.30 -0.17 -0.27
National 1.07 0.79 1.01 0.38 -0.48 0.07 0.35 0.11
C.  34 Percent Effective Corporate Marginal Income Tax Rate
Household 0.91 0.78 0.95 0.53 0.01 0.37 0.52 0.38
Government 0.37 0.19 0.27 -0.03 -0.46 -0.21 -0.03 -0.13
National 1.28 0.97 1.22 0.50 -0.45 0.16 0.49 0.25
Notes:  The new household saving estimates are from Table 8.  The government saving estimates represent the
present value at age 55 of the annual gain in federal government revenue from the provision of 401(k)s
relative to a taxable savings instrument per dollar of 401(k) wealth.  Their calculation follows Feldstein (1995)
and is described in Appendix C.  Negative government saving means a loss in government revenue.  The new
national saving is the sum of the household and government saving estimates and is expressed per dollar of
401(k) wealth.  The statutory corporate marginal income tax rate in 1992 was 34 percent.44
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TABLE 1
Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility and
Income:  Poterba, Venti, and Wise Results from the 1991 SIPP
Annual Household Income
(thousands of dollars) Asset Category and
Eligibility Status <10 10-20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-75 >75
A.  Total financial assets







   Not eligible for a 401(k) 1,378 1,997 2,558 3,256 6,206 10,080 29,842
B.  Non-IRA-401(k) assets




   Not eligible for a 401(k) 663 1,063 1,411 2,052 4,250 5,437 17,000
C.  401(k) Assets




   Not eligible for a 401(k) 0 0 0 0000
D.  IRA assets
   Eligible for a 401(k) 0 0 0 0 0 1,437 6,029
*
   Not eligible for a 401(k) 0 0 0 0 0 978 2,882
     
*Difference between eligibles and non-eligibles is significant at the 5 percent significance level.
Source: Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995), Table 3, panel (a).50
TABLE 2
Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility and Income:
Results from Self-Reported HRS Data
Annual Household Income
(thousands of dollars) Asset Category and
Eligibility Status <20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-75 >75
A. Total financial assets
   Eligible 9,457 16,235 30,011 29,708 62,318 118,204
   Not eligible 4,559 6,606 10,509 13,755 27,129 52,659
   Difference 4,898 9,629 19,502 15,953 35,189 65,545
   [p-value] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.00001] [0.0004] [0.00001] [0.00001]
B.Non-IRA-401(k) financial assets
   Eligible 2,465 4,148 7,449 8,949 14,972 28,919
   Not eligible 2,378 3,811 6,076 7,065 12,835 24,486
   Difference     87 337 1,373 1,885 2,137 4,434
   [p-value] [0.81] [0.61] [0.23] [0.36]     [0.31] [0.46]
C. 401(k) Assets
   Eligible 1,145 4,754 8,271 6,725 15,317 29,669
   Not eligible 0 0 0        0 0 0
   Difference 1,145 4,754 8,271 6,725 15,317 29,669
   [p-value] [0.00001] [0.00001] [0.00001] [000001] [0.00001] [0.00001]
D. IRA assets
   Eligible 0      0       0      0 6,000 20,000
   Not eligible 0      0       0      0 3,000 13,000
   Difference 0 0 0 0 3,000 7,000
   [p-value] [0.85] [1.00] [1.00] [1.00]     [0.19] [0.05]
E. Total financial and pension assets
   Eligible 25,297 44,075 69,997   86,431 152,843 331,149
   Not eligible 23,222 46,006 72,520 100,942 158,401 293,752
   Difference 2,075 -1,931 -2,523 -14,511 -5,558    37,397
   [p-value] [0.43] [0.96] [0.88] [0.51]     [0.88]     [0.28]
F. Non-401(k) pension assets
   Eligible 6,601 8,900 14,332 29,037 75,910 164,898
   Not eligible 9,000 19,775 45,764 63,787 84,502 176,837
   Difference 2,399 -10,875 -31,432 -34,750 -8,592 -11,939




(thousands of dollars) Asset Category and
Eligibility Status <20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-75 >75
G. Social Security Assets
   Eligible 103,529 117,137 130,185 140,813 147,876 157,309
   Not eligible 98,198 115,385 124,391 134,077 138,882 144,337
   Difference 5,331     1,752 5,794 6,734 8,994 12,972
   [p-value] [0.03] [0.56] [0.18] [0.12] [0.004] [0.02]
H. Financial and Housing Wealth
   Eligible 44,489 55,403 77,901 81,838 130,589 214,723
   Not eligible 29,202 46,611 59,475 66,953 83,650 142,754
   Difference 15,287 8,792 18,426 14,885 46,939 71,969
   [p-value] [0.16] [0.33] [0.06] [0.30] [0.00001] [0.004]
I. Housing Wealth
   Eligible 27,640 32,790 42,374 40,467 58,001 75,081
   Not eligible 18,298 34,563 38,515 48,215 46,470 64,012
   Difference 9,432 -1,773 3,859 -7,748 11,531 11,069
   [p-value] [0.01] [0.67] [0.46] [0.14]   [0.005] [0.15]
J. Non-Social Security Wealth
   Eligible 75,908 108,704 153,447 165,019 271,702 517,663
   Not eligible 62,340 107,307 153,660 196,343 260,721 459,940
   Difference 13,518 1,397 -213 -31,324 10,981 57,723
   [p-value] [0.41] [0.98] [0.99] [0.50]    [0.77] [0.29]
K. Total Wealth
   Eligible 184,005 231,427 282,346 304,325 408,602 659,054
   Not eligible 163,319 218,828 282,530 329,114 400,531 595,120
   Difference 20,686 12,599 -186 -24,789 8,071 63,934
   [p-value] [0.53] [0.61] [0.99] [0.44]     [0.82] [0.33]
Mean 401(k) Wealth for
Eligible Households
8,034 10,882 15,839 21,611 37,987 69,572
New Household Saving per
Dollar of 401(k) Wealth
0.26 -0.18 -0.16 -0.67 -0.15 0.54
Household-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth -0.02
(0.48)
Dollar-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth 0.15
(0.31)
Number of Observations 4,318
Notes: Conditional median asset balances derived from the parameter estimates from equation (2) evaluated at the
sample means of the demographic variables for the sample of 4,318 households defined in the text. The estimates in
panels G and K were over a sample of 3,927 households.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  p-values for the test of the
null hypothesis of no difference in assets are in square brackets.  Standard errors and p-values are based on bootstrapped
estimated variances with 300 replications.  New household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth is the difference in total
financial and pension assets between eligible and ineligible households divided by the mean 401(k) wealth for eligible
households from the self-reported data for each income category, respectively.52
TABLE 3
Self-Reported Versus Firm-Reported 401(k) Eligibility for Households with



















A.  Households with Matches on Current and Past Jobs
Self-Reported 41.2 30.7 35.9 33.2 37.1 48.0 57.7
Firm-Reported 43.4 39.9 44.0 41.9 41.3 44.0 48.1
B.  Households with Match on Current Job
Self-Reported 41.7 28.1 36.1 35.0 37.3 48.5 55.9
Firm-Reported 45.0 40.1 45.5 44.6 42.0 45.2 50.8
  Notes: Author’s calculations based on the sample of 1,312 households with matched firm pension records on
current and past jobs in panel A and the sample of 2,248 households with matched firm pension records on the
current job in panel B.  Data sources for self- and firm-reported eligibility are described in Appendix A.53
TABLE 4
Type of Measurement Error for Pension on Current Job







A. Self-Reported Not Eligible, Firm-
Reported Not Eligible
38.3 489
B. Self-Reported Eligible, Firm-Reported
Eligible
21.9 287
C. Self-Reported Not Eligible, Firm-
Reported Eligible
21.5 282
1. Self-reported defined benefit plan,
failed to report 401(k) plan
17.9 235
2. Self-reported defined contribution
plan, failed to report 401(k) plan
3.6 47
D. Self-Reported Eligible, Firm-Reported
Not Eligible
19.3 254
1. Self-reported defined benefit plan,
erroneously reported 401(k) plan
12.3 162
2. Self-reported defined contribution
plan, erroneously reported 401(k)
plan
7.0 92
Notes: Author’s calculations based on the sample of 1,312 households with matched firm pension
records on current and past jobs.   Similar results were obtained in the sample of 2,248 households
with matched firm pension records on the current job and are not shown.  Data sources for self-
and firm-reported eligibility are described in Appendix A.TABLE 5
Mean and Median Assets by Measurement Error Cell and Household Income Category
Sample: Households with Matches on Current and Past Jobs



























A. Households with Income < $20,000
Not Eligible 47.2 22.1 10,018 10,995 15,451 16,842 55,521 46,729
(77) (36) [500] [250] [500] [250] [39,474] [25,691]
Eligible 12.9 17.8 12,007 17,271 22,593 25,863 43,289 43,841
(21) (29) [50] [1,500] [3,000] [7,004] [7,325] [21,128]
 p-Value for Test of Equal Asset Distributions 0.19 0.0001 0.05
B. Households with $30,000 in Income
Not Eligible 38.3 25.8 14,520 13,377 19,383 19,271 69,712 70,802
(80) (54) [2,050] [2,500] [3,000] [4,750] [53,626] [50,097]
Eligible 17.7 18.2 8,248 8,204 23,736 23,629 52,404 51,304
(37) (38) [3,000] [2,000] [18,300] [12,000] [32,500] [35,868]
 p-Value for Test of Equal Asset Distributions 0.77 0.0001 0.14
C. Households with $30,000-$40,000 in income
Not Eligible 40.5 26.3 17,239 21,231 23,034 31,731 149,700 131,236
(88) (57) [6,500] [6,000] [11,625] [9,000] [132,488] [94,968]
Eligible 17.5 15.7 40,627 23,276 73,123 60,638 130,865 98,816
(38) (34) [10,100] [5,040] [44,000] [26,911] [100,087] [68,385]
p-Value for Test of Equal Asset Distributions 0.38 0.0001 0.0955
TABLE 5
 Continued
Sample: Households with Matches on Current and Past Jobs



























D. Households with $40,000-$50,000 in income
Not Eligible 42.2 20.7 23,640 22,055 33,785 35,351 208,952 180,995
(90) (44) [6,000] [9,750] [12,000] [17,250] [202,596] [166,410]
Eligible 16.4 20.7 34,761 21,917 81,554 47,876 207,314 112,996
(35) (44) [10,000] [8,075] [40,000] [28,177] [175,150] [79,985]
p-Value for Test of Equal Asset Distributions 0.77 0.0001 0.001
E. Households with $50,000-$75,000 in income
Not Eligible 33.8 18.2 41,345 44,184 59,974 61,222 274,408 214,759
(102) (55) [11,700] [17,000] [20,500] [26,500] [254,846] [170,000]
Eligible 22.2 25.8 74,688 49,106 86,507 103,472 272,990 257,098
(67) (78) [17,000] [14,750] [69,500] [70,000] [272,668] [189,828]
p-Value for Test of Equal Asset Distributions 0.43 0.0001 0.20
F. Households with income > $75,000
Not Eligible 25.0 17.3 87,835 91,482 142,431 117,549 514,778 530,408
(52) (36) [25,000] [37,500] [67,500] [50,350] [484,480] [328,625]
Eligible 26.9 30.8 135,570 69,670 266,847 176,810 654,293 397,145
(56) (64) [35,800] [40,000] [115,000] [129,000] [551,299] [319,425]
p-Value for Test of Equal Asset Distributions 0.86 0.003 0.003
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 show the percent of the sample of 1,312 households with matched pension records in each self-/firm-reported eligibility cell by household
income category.  Cell sizes are in parentheses. Columns 3 through 8 show the unconditional mean balances for three asset measures for each eligibility cell.  The
unconditional median balances are in square brackets.  The last line of each panel shows the p-value for the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test of the null hypothesis of
equal cell asset distributions.  Failure to reject the null hypothesis is evidence that the measurement error in eligibility was uncorrelated with saving behavior.TABLE 6
Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility on Current Job and
Household Income Category:  HRS Results with Self-Reported Pension Assets and Self-Reported Eligibility
on the Firm-Reported Sample
Annual Household Income
(thousands of dollars) Dependent Variable and
Eligibility on Current Job < 20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-75 > 75
A. Total Financial Assets
   Eligible 4,843 13,477 28,607 28,839 64,324 123,208
   Not Eligible 2,559 5,303 11,083 12,277 24,496 58,005
   Difference 2,284 8,174 17,524 16,562 39,828 65,203
   [p-value] [0.04] [0.004] [0.06] [0.01] [0.0001] [0.004]
B.  Non-IRA-401(k) Financial Asset
   Eligible 1,731 2,875 7,753 6,032 14,386 39,018
   Not Eligible 1,564 2,881 6,652 6,295 12,449 26,707
   Difference 167 -6 1,100 -264 1,937 12,311
   [p-value] [0.39] [0.99] [0.57] [0.93] [0.56] [0.19]
C.  Total Financial and Pension Assets
   Eligible 17,003 39,014 88,310 86,820 224,536 388,101
   Not Eligible 15,991 37,342 73,264 142,190 168,383 325,295
   Difference 1,012 1,672 15,045 -55,369 55,152 62,805
   [p-value] [0.39] [0.80] [0.39] [0.05] [0.03] [0.28]
D.  Non-401(k) Pension Assets
   Eligible 3,308 4,867 17,965 37,464 123,588 237,618
   Not Eligible 3,953 10,208 45,207 99,266 111,727 193,501
   Difference -645 -5,342 -27,243 -61,802 11,862 44,117
   [p-value] [0.31] [0.68] [0.39] [0.22] [0.69] [0.28]
Mean 401(k) Wealth for
Eligible Households
3,243 10,285 22,979 18,120 32,274 79,123
New Household Saving Per
Dollar of 401(k) Wealth
0.31 0.16 0.65 -3.06 1.71 0.79
Household-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth 0.32
(0.38)
Dollar-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth 0.71
(0.45)
Number of Observations 2,237
Notes:  Conditional median asset balances derived from the parameter estimates from equation (2) evaluated
at the sample means of the demographic variables for the sample of 2,237 households defined in the text.
Standard errors are in parentheses.  p-values for the test of the null hypothesis of no difference in assets are
in square brackets.   Standard errors and p-values based on bootstrapped estimated variances with 300
replications.  New household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth is the difference in total financial and
pension assets between eligible and ineligible households divided by the mean 401(k) wealth for eligible
households from the self-reported data for each income category, respectively.57
TABLE 7
Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility on Current Job and
Household Income Category:  HRS Results with Self-Reported Pension Assets and Firm-Reported
Eligibility on the Firm-Reported Sample
Annual Household Income
(thousands of dollars) Dependent Variable and
Eligibility on Current Job < 20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-75 > 75
A. Total Financial Assets
   Eligible 3,781 7,615 13,662 21,077 44,942 95,939
   Not Eligible 2,538 5,615 16,787 15,729 33,703 79,433
   Difference 1,243 2,000 -3,125 5,348 11,239 16,506
   [p-value] [0.03] [0.20] [0.47] [0.23] [0.28] [0.51]
B.  Non-IRA-401(k) Financial Asset
   Eligible 1,674 2,646 6,528 6,976 13,654 34,336
   Not Eligible 1,602 2,906 7,904 6,118 12,409 28,130
   Difference 72 -260 -1,376 858 1,245 11,206
   [p-value] [0.77] [0.79] [0.44] [0.72] [0.70] [0.27]
C.  Total Financial and Pension Assets
   Eligible 20,635 49,635 78,743 91,891 178,047 325,658
   Not Eligible 15,068 31,341 74,510 136,812 193,971 404,010
   Difference 5,567 18,294 4,233 -44,921 -15,924 -78,352
   [p-value] [0.42] [0.01] [0.80] [0.10] [0.55] [0.06]
D.  Non-401(k) Pension Assets
   Eligible 4,526 26,075 48,829 64,346 106,780 188,231
   Not Eligible 3,679 5,820 26,282 81,374 123,728 227,800
   Difference 847 20,255 22,547 -17,028 -16,948 -39,579
   [p-value] [0.37] [0.005] [0.05] [0.45] [0.38] [0.36]
Mean 401(k) Wealth for
Eligible Households
1,714 5,338 9,170 6,506 21,928 43,417
New Household Saving Per
Dollar of 401(k) Wealth
3.25 3.42 0.46 -6.90 -0.73 -1.80
Household-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth -0.49
(1.00)
Dollar-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth -1.28
(0.68)
Number of Observations 2,237
Notes:  Conditional median asset balances derived from the parameter estimates from equation (2) evaluated
at the sample means of the demographic variables for the sample of 2,237 households defined in the text.
Standard errors are in parentheses.   p-values for the test of the null hypothesis of no difference in assets are
in square brackets.  Standard errors and p-values based on bootstrapped estimated variances with 300
replications.  New household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth is the difference in total financial and
pension assets between eligible and ineligible households divided by the mean 401(k) wealth for eligible
households from the self-reported data for each income category, respectively.58
TABLE 8
Conditional Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility on Current Job and
Household Income Category:  HRS Results with Firm-Reported Pension Assets and Eligibility
Annual Household Income
(thousands of dollars) Dependent Variable and
Eligibility on Current Job < 20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-75 > 75
A. Total Financial Assets
   Eligible 5,836 22,659 46,919 39,034 95,508 165,739
   Not Eligible 2,374 4,875 13,795 12,037 24,668 60,068
   Difference 3,462 17,784 22,124 26,997 70,840 105,671
   [p-value] [0.15] [0.01] [0.001] [0.001] [0.0002] [0.002]
B.  Non-IRA-401(k) Financial Asset
   Eligible 1,674 2,646 6,528 6,976 13,654 34,336
   Not Eligible 1,602 2,906 7,904 6,118 12,409 28,130
   Difference 72 -260 -1,376 858 1,245 11,206
   [p-value] [0.77] [0.79] [0.44] [0.72] [0.70] [0.27]
C.  Total Financial and Pension Assets
   Eligible 17,594 59,747 101,788 102,983 161,702 366,021
   Not Eligible 10,458 30,318 65,796 80,606 160,624 305,863
   Difference 7,134 29,429 35,992 22,377 1,078 60,158
   [p-value] [0.07] [0.02] [0.003] [0.26] [0.97] [0.18]
Mean 401(k) Wealth for
Eligible Households
7,867 37,978 37,895 41,877 76,799 164,378
New Household Saving Per
Dollar of 401(k) Wealth
0.91 0.78 0.95 0.53 0.01 0.37
Household-Weighted Average New Household Saving Per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth 0.52
(0.15)
Dollar-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth 0.38
(0.16)
Number of Observations 2,237
Notes:  Conditional median asset balances derived from the parameter estimates from equation (2) evaluated
at the sample means of the demographic variables for the sample of 2,237 households defined in the text.
Standard errors are in parentheses.  p-values for the test of the null hypothesis of no difference in assets are
in square brackets.  Standard errors and p-values based on bootstrapped estimated variances with 300
replications.  New household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth is the difference in total financial and
pension assets between eligible and ineligible households divided by the mean 401(k) wealth for eligible
households from the firm-reported data for each income category, respectively.59
TABLE 9
Conditional Median Total Financial and Pension Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility on Current Job and
Household Income Category:  Results for the Integration of Firm- and Self-Reported Pension Assets
Annual Household Income
(thousands of dollars)
Eligibility on Current Job < 20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-75 > 75
   Eligible 17,691 45,591 84,485 85,214 141,642 284,184
   Not Eligible 10,424 30,167 63,738 87,051 160,395 305,499
   Difference 7,267 15,424 20,747 -1,837 -18,753 -21,315
   [p-value] [0.01] [0.23] [0.39] [0.83] [0.04] [0.80]
Mean 401(k) Wealth for
Eligible Households
2,874 19,769 23,463 20,070 38,422 85,997
New Household Saving Per
Dollar of 401(k) Wealth
2.53 0.78 0.88 -0.09 -0.49 -0.25
Household-Weighted Average New Household Saving Per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth 0.35
(0.29)
Dollar-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth -0.08
(0.29)
Number of Observations 2,237
Notes:  Conditional median asset balances derived from the parameter estimates from equation (2) evaluated
at the sample means of the demographic variables for the sample of 2,237 households defined in the text.
Standard errors are in parentheses.  p-values for the test of the null hypothesis of no difference in assets are
in square brackets.  Standard errors and p-values based on bootstrapped estimated variances with 300
replications.  New household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth is the difference in total financial and
pension assets between eligible and ineligible households divided by the mean 401(k) wealth for eligible
households from the firm-reported data for each income category, respectively.60
TABLE 10
Conditional Median Total Financial and Pension Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility on Current Job and
Household Income Category:  Results for the Integration of Firm- and Self-Reported Pension Assets,
Controlling for Error in Reported Defined Contribution Plan
Annual Household Income
(thousands of dollars)
Eligibility on Current Job < 20 20-30 30-40 40-50 50-75 > 75
   Eligible 12,625 41,395 65,253 86,205 133,687 268,849
   Not Eligible 9,625 25,534 48,026 87,245 157,108 282,126
   Difference 3,000 15,861 17,227 -1,040 -23,421 -13,277
   [p-value] [0.41] [0.28] [0.41] [0.96] [0.40] [0.76]
Mean 401(k) Wealth for
Eligible Households
2,874 19,769 23,463 20,070 38,422 85,997
New Household Saving Per
Dollar of 401(k) Wealth
1.04 0.80 0.73 -0.05 -0.61 -0.15
Household-Weighted Average New Household Saving Per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth 0.17
(0.32)
Dollar-Weighted Average New Household Saving per Dollar of 401(k) Wealth -0.09
(0.34)
Number of Observations 2,237
Notes:  Conditional median asset balances derived from the parameter estimates from equation (2) evaluated
at the sample means of the demographic variables for the sample of 2,237 households defined in the text.
Standard errors are in parentheses.  p-values for the test of the null hypothesis of no difference in assets are
in square brackets.  Standard errors and p-values based on bootstrapped estimated variances with 300
replications.  New household saving per dollar of 401(k) wealth is the difference in total financial and
pension assets between eligible and ineligible households divided by the mean 401(k) wealth for eligible











































Source: U.S. Department of Labor (2000), Tables E4 and E23.62
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